| 摘要: | 在歷經亞洲金融風暴後，公司治理(corporate governance)在國際間普遍地受到重視。屬於控制權市場利器之委託書競爭，在公司治理上之重要目的—防制經營者濫權，使經營者向股東負責的面向上，扮演重要之角色。 參照2004年OECD的公司治理準則，公司治理所應重視之議題，其中即包含股東權益與重要之所有權能，特別是確保股東有權參與股東會及行使表決權。在現代公司發生經營與所有分離的現象，委託書徵求之過程成為現代意義股東會的情形下，委託書之運用，成了關鍵之問題，如同美國證券法鴻儒Loss教授所言：「放任委託書之使用，委託書將誘使經營者長期留任及不負責任；善加管理，則它將是挽救現代公司機制之工具。」 委託書徵求戰，往往涉及鉅額之費用，根據統計之結果，美國在2003年到2005年間的委託書爭奪戰中，平均費用為美金368,000元，鉅額的徵求費用如何分配，涉及了公司經營者使用公司資金徵求目的之控制，另一方面則直接影響了在野徵求者發起委託書競爭之決策。針對此問題，我國之公司法、證券交易法及委託書規則均未明確規範，而依主管機關全盤否定由公司負擔之見解，與美國之司法實務、州法及學說則係大相逕庭，本文認為此影響委託書管理之重要議題應有研究之必要，故以本議題為探討中心，希冀藉由美國法之實務判決及學說之介紹，並輔以經濟分析之方法，提供我國未來制定相關規範之參考。 After the Asian Financial meltdown, the corporate governance becomes popular topic in the whole world. Proxy contests, the powerful device of the market for corporate control, play the important roles in corporate governance by which shareholders hold management accountable. According to the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance 2004, the corporate governance should emphasize the rights of shareholders and key ownership functions, especially the rights to participate and vote in general shareholder meetings. As the ownership and control had become separated in the large publicly held corporation, realistically the solicitation of proxies is today the stockholders` meeting. The usage of the proxy plays the key role. As Prof. Loss observed, “Unregulated, it is an open invitation to self-perpetuation and irresponsibility of management. Properly circumscribed, it may well turn out to be the salvation of the modern corporate system.” The proxy contests usually involved substantial costs. Based on proxy statements filed by outsiders engaged in proxy solicitations during 2003 to 2005, the average cost of a contest was $368,000. The allocation of the substantial costs influences not only how the manager’s use of corporate funds to solicit the proxies, but whether the challengers decide to enter the proxy contest. The corporate law, securities law and the proxy rules in Taiwan do not regulate the issues of the cost allocation. However, according to the effective official explanation, neither the incumbents nor the challengers have the right to use the corporate funds to solicit the proxies when the control contests occur. Such attitude of the explanation is totally different from the courts and state law in United States, and it is the open question in the literature. The thesis not only seeks to introduce the cases, state law and the comment of United States but provide economic analysis of cost allocation. The conclusion provides foundation of the legislation in Taiwan. |
