當供應商面臨一個風險趨避的零售商在營收分享合約下所達成的通路協調Channel; coordination under the revenue sharing contract when a supplier faces a risk-averse retailer

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题名:	當供應商面臨一個風險趨避的零售商在營收分享合約下所達成的通路協調Channel;coordination under the revenue sharing contract when a supplier faces a risk-averse retailer
作者:	李彥璁;Yen-tsung Lee
贡献者:	工業管理研究所
关键词:	通路協調;營收分享合約;風險趨避;channel coordination;revenue sharing contract;risk aversion
日期:	2010-06-22
上传时间:	2010-12-08 14:45:00 (UTC+8)
出版者:	國立中央大學
摘要:	通路協調已經在很多的論文中被探討,其目標是極大化整體供應鏈的利潤進而提升供應商及零售商的利潤。有很多誘因機制被提出來以達成通路協調。舉例來說,在營收分享合約裡,供應商提供一個較低的批發價給零售商,但必須享有零售商一部分比例的收益以達成通路協調。過去的研究都是立基於假設供應商和零售商為風險中立者。然而,決策制定者對風險可能有不同的感受,這些感受會影響其所作的決定。因此,我們在營收分享合約裡考量了決策者的風險感受。本研究中,我們依據決策者的風險感受來探討營收分享合約。在推式合約之下,供應商提供營收分享合約給零售商,以達到增加彼此利潤的目的；由於零售商承擔存貨風險,因此零售商對風險的感受會影響其所做的決定。所以當供應商面對風險趨避的零售商時,應該考量其風險態度來訂定決策。本文透過營收分享合約的模型探討兩種情況;情況一是探討當供應商不知道他所面對的零售商是風險趨避者的情形。而情況二是供應商知道他所面對的零售商是風險趨避者。我們發現在情況一下無法達成通路協調,而在情況二下可以達成通路協調。Channel coordination has been discussed in many studies, whose objective is to maximize the supply chain's profit that elevates both the supplier's and the retailer's profits. Many coordination mechanisms were proposed to achieve channel coordination. For example, in a revenue sharing contract, the supplier provides a lower wholesale price with sharing a certain fraction of revenue to achieve channel coordination. Most of coordination mechanisms are discussed based on considering risk-neutral decision makers. In other words, the supplier's and the retailer's attitudes toward risks are assumed risk-neural when making decisions. However, the decision makers may have different preferences toward risks. Therefore, we consider their risk preferences into the design of revenue sharing contract in this study. In a push contract, the retailer bears all of the inventory risk, and the retailer's attitude toward risk affects her decision. As a result, it is important for the supplier to consider the opponent's risk preference. In this study, the supplier provides a revenue sharing contract to the risk-averse retailer in order to increase both profits. We analyze two cases. In case 1, the supplier does not know the retailer is risk-averse, and in case 2, the supplier knows the retailer is risk-averse. We discuss these two cases in the revenue sharing contract and we find that channel coordination cannot be achieved in case 1, but it can be achieved in case 2.
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