本論文探討廠商業主如何在致力於從事企業社會責任 (Corporate Social Responsibility, CSR) 活動的努力下，設計委任經理人的CSR誘因報酬比例機制。假定在寡占市場內，僅有兩家廠商，並且生產差異化的產品。此市場內的消費者具有CSR意識，且能觀察到廠商的CSR活動努力程度。兩家廠商將決定是否從事CSR活動，以及是否委任經理人從事CSR活動和生產決策。經理人願意投入多少CSR的努力程度，取決於廠商所設計的CSR誘因報酬比例，因此本論文假設了廠商業主委任經理人從事CSR活動努力的程度及產量相關的報酬比例，探討當廠商業主決定從事CSR活動與否，所應面臨委任經理人的報酬比例機制。廠商業主以利潤最大化為目標，決定應給予經理人的報酬比例，而經理人以報酬最大化為目標，決定接受委任後所應從事的CSR活動努力程度及產量。我們發現，當消費者具有CSR意識時，廠商從事CSR活動的均衡產量、價格及利潤均高於不從事CSR活動的均衡產量、價格及利潤。因此，廠商選擇致力於從事CSR活動的努力程度，藉以提高利潤。而在分權管理的經營模式下，廠商業主將以最適正向的產量報酬比例，促使經理人達成從事CSR活動的目標。;This dissertation investigates how firms’ owners design the incentive schemes for hiring managers to do the production and corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities. We consider an oligopoly market that consists of two firms. The two firms produce the differentiated products. The consumers prefer and can observe CSR behavior provided by the firms. Each firm’s owner considers to undertake CSR activities or not, and whether hire a manager. Each firm’s owner first designs a reward mechanism for the proportion his/her manager reward base upon maximizing profit. A manager decides its firm’s CSR activities effort and output level base upon maximizing his/her reward that designed by owner. We find that when the consumers prefer CSR activities, equilibrium outputs, prices, and profits are all higher under CSR activities than no CSR activities are undertaken. Therefore, the firms would choose to undertake CSR activities. Besides, if the owner decides to hire the managers, the reward mechanism should be designed optimally a postive reward proportion of production to achieve its objective of undertake CSR activities.
