本文通過分析一個簡單的雙邊道德風險問題契約關係證據生產模型，探討契約條款的可驗證性概念。 在完整的信息下，最優合同將被誇大，因此效率低下，但是在均衡狀態下，實際的效率水平是有效的。 同時也表明合同期限在證據提供成本中是嚴格增加的，這可以解釋為不可核實的程度。 還討論了其他有趣的計劃。 ;This paper explores the notion of verifiability regarding contractual terms by analyzing a simple model of evidence production in contractual relationships with two sided moral hazard problem. Under complete information, the optimal contract will be inflated and hence inefficient, however in equilibrium, the actual performance level will be efficient. It is also shown that contractual term is strictly increasing in evidence provision cost, which can be interpret as the degree of non-verifiability. Other interest plans to proceed are also discussed.
