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    請使用永久網址來引用或連結此文件: http://ir.lib.ncu.edu.tw/handle/987654321/83607


    題名: 勞動力投資決策與銀行貸款條件;Labor Investment Decisions and Bank Loan Terms
    作者: 賴姿吟;LAI, ZI-YIN
    貢獻者: 財務金融學系
    關鍵詞: 勞動力投資效率;銀行貸款;債務成本;信用風險;管理層行為;Labor investment efficiency;Bank loans;Cost of debt;Credit risk;Managerial behavior
    日期: 2020-06-30
    上傳時間: 2020-09-02 16:43:08 (UTC+8)
    出版者: 國立中央大學
    摘要: 本文主要探討企業的勞動力投資行為,與其後續銀行貸款條件的關聯性。利用1986年至2015年間的美國上市公司為研究樣本,實證結果首先顯示,勞動力投資效率愈低的公司,進而獲取的貸款利差愈高,基於證據表明企業勞動力投資行為影響其信用風險,本文考量兩個可能的解釋,第一,此投資決策可作為衡量未來現金流量不確定性的指標;第二,其能提供貸方評估組織管理層行為的有用資訊。而透過子樣本分析所支持的論點為後者,其結果發現勞動力投資低效率對貸款利差的影響效果,在公司未來現金流量短缺的風險越高時弱化,但在銀行能獲取越多公司內部積累的負面資訊時強化。其次,銀行針對勞動力投資效率較低的公司,同時要求較為嚴格的非價格條件,包括較短的貸款期限、較少的參貸機構、較高機率的擔保品要求和限制條款運用,以便於事後對公司的信用品質進行監控。上述實證結果在控制潛在內生性偏誤、貸款條件共同決定、變數衡量誤差與貸款契約非獨立性等問題後,仍然穩健成立。總體而言,銀行評估借方信用風險時,會加以考慮其勞動力投資行為,本文據此給予企業應重視員工配置效率的觀點。;This paper investigates the association between a firm’s labor investment behavior and its subsequent bank loan terms. Using a sample of U.S. listed firms from 1986 to 2015, the empirical results show that firms with lower labor investment efficiency obtain higher loan spreads. Based on evidence that labor investment behavior of the firm affects its credit risk, this study considers two possible explanations. First, this investment decision is able to be a proxy for uncertainty in future cash flows. Second, it can provide useful information for lenders to assess the behavior of the organizational management. The latter argument is supported by the subsample analysis which indicates that the effect of labor investment inefficiency on loan spreads is weaker when the firm has a higher risk of future cash flow shortages, and stronger when banks may collect more negative information accumulated within the firm. Further, firms with lower labor investment efficiency have tighter non-price loan terms that facilitate the ex post monitoring of credit quality, such as shorter maturities, fewer lenders, higher likelihood of being secured, and more covenant restrictions. The above findings are robust after controlling potential endogeneity bias, joint determination of various loan terms, variable with measurement error and interdependence among facilities. Taken together, banks take into account borrowers’ labor investment behavior in evaluating borrower credit risk. This research provides firms with a perspective that they should pay close attention to employee allocation efficiency.
    顯示於類別:[財務金融研究所] 博碩士論文

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