影響高階經理人薪酬因素之探討

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曾國恩(Kuo-En Tseng) 查詢紙本館藏

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人力資源管理研究所

論文名稱

影響高階經理人薪酬因素之探討
(The determinants of top executives’ compensation)

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摘要(中)

高階經理人的薪酬一直是各界關注的議題，特別是欲理解隱藏在高階經理人薪酬背後的設計邏輯。本研究以我國上市上櫃公司高階經理人為研究對象，並依據企業控制型態分為單一家族主導及專業經理人治理兩個獨立樣本，自變數涵蓋經濟性、複雜性及組織治理三種構面等九個變數，依變數將高階經理人薪酬分為固定薪與變動薪，變數資料皆取自台灣經濟新報資料庫，以2006至2010年為研究期間。基於薪酬設計的原則是給予過去努力成果的報酬，本研究將追蹤資料以固定效果模型進行實証分析得到以下結論：
1.在總樣本下，高階經理人平均固定薪與董事兼任經理人比率有顯著負相關；平均變動薪則與每股盈餘有顯著正相關，與平減後股票年報酬率及研發投入程度有顯著的負相關；
2.在單一家族主導樣本下，高階經理人平均固定薪與董事兼任經理人比率有顯著負相關；平均變動薪則與每股盈餘有顯著的正相關，與平減後股票年報酬率、研發投入程度及董事兼任經理人比率有顯著的負相關；
3.在專業經理人治理樣本下，高階經理人平均固定薪與平減後股票年報酬率及營收成長率有顯著的正相關，與機構法人持股比率有顯著負相關；平均變動薪則與每股盈餘及營收成長率有顯著的正相關，與獨立董事比率有顯著負相關。
　　未來研究若能更擴大研究期間、多探討與時事相關的變數，不管在學術或實務界，對於影響我國高階經理人薪酬因素之探討必能帶來更多貢獻。

摘要(英)

This study examined the determinants of top executives’ fixed and variable compensation from three aspects including factors of economic, complexity, and organizational governance. The study collected data from companies either listed in the Taiwan Stock Exchange or traded Over-the-Counter (OTC). A five-year longitudinal analysis (2006-2010) was conducted by the panel data estimation technique to examine the factors that affect the compensation of top executives. The result indicated that:
1.In the total sample, Proportion of executive on board is negatively associated with top executive fixed compensation. EPS is positively associated with variable compensation while Annual stock returns and R&D expenditure rate are　negatively associated with variable compensation.
2.In the single family-controlled sample, Proportion of executive on board is negatively associated with top executive fixed compensation. EPS is positively associated with variable compensation while Annual stock returns and R&D expenditure rate are negatively associated with variable compensation.
3.In the professional executive-controlled sample, Annual stock returns and Annual growth in net sales are positively associated with top executive fixed compensation while Institution ownership is negatively associated with fixed compensation. Annual stock returns and Annual growth in net sales are positively associated with variable compensation while Proportion of Independent director is negatively associated with variable compensation.

關鍵字(中)

★ 變動薪
★ 高階經理人薪酬
★ 單一家族主導
★ 固定薪
★ 專業經理人治理

關鍵字(英)

★ fixed compensation
★ variable compensation
★ top executive compensation

論文目次

中文摘要 i
ABSTRACT ii
目錄 iii
表目錄 iv
第壹章緒論 1
第一節　研究背景與動機 1
第二節　研究目的 4
第貳章文獻探討 5
第一節經濟性因素 5
第二節複雜性因素 7
第三節組織治理因素 9
第參章研究方法 14
第一節　資料來源與樣本選取 14
第二節　變數定義與衡量 15
第三節　實證模型 17
第四節資料分析方法 18
第肆章實證結果 19
第一節　敘述統計分析 19
第二節相關係數矩陣 22
第三節迴歸分析 25
第伍章結論與建議 29
第一節結論 29
第二節研究貢獻與管理意涵 36
第三節研究限制與建議 38
參考文獻 40

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指導教授

林文政(Wen-Jeng Lin)

審核日期

2012-7-25

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