家族企業的投資現金流量敏感度

以作者查詢圖書館館藏

、以作者查詢臺灣博碩士

、以作者查詢全國書目

、勘誤回報

、線上人數：91

、訪客IP：3.147.52.53

姓名

郭怡萍(Yi-ping Kuo) 查詢紙本館藏

畢業系所

企業管理學系

論文名稱

家族企業的投資現金流量敏感度
(Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivity in Family Businesses)

相關論文

★ 股權分置對中國上市公司現金股利發放之影響	★ 所有權結構與政治連結對股利政策之影響—以中國國有企業為例
★ 董監事最低持股成數規定之研究	★ 合格境外機構投資人制度對投資/現金流量敏感度之影響
★ 從股票價格區間探討股票買回活動之資訊內涵	★ 跨境上市對於企業負債比率的影響：以中國跨港上市公司為例
★ 家族集團之盈餘管理行為	★ 股權結構與投資效率:中國上市公司之多重大股東實證研究
★ 股權分置改革對中國上市公司現金持有的影響	★ 手機按鍵生命週期探討企業轉型之路
★ 制度改革對於關係人交易的影響	★ 伊斯蘭教義、公司治理與營運資金管理對公司價值影響之研究—以印尼上市公司為例
★ 股利宣告對股價超常報酬的影響-以台灣集團與非集團上市公司為例	★ 公司規模、股價、益本比、淨值市價比與股票超常報酬關係之實證研究
★ 台灣股票上市公司營運資金管理相關議題之實證研究	★ 我國財務危機上市公司股權結構之探討

檔案

[Endnote RIS 格式]

[Bibtex 格式]

[相關文章]

[文章引用]

[完整記錄]

[館藏目錄]

[檢視]

[下載]

本電子論文使用權限為同意立即開放。
已達開放權限電子全文僅授權使用者為學術研究之目的，進行個人非營利性質之檢索、閱讀、列印。
請遵守中華民國著作權法之相關規定，切勿任意重製、散佈、改作、轉貼、播送，以免觸法。

摘要(中)

本研究探討家族企業在投資行為上與一般企業是否有差異，分析家族股權集中程度對其投資現金流量敏感度的影響。研究發現家族企業相對於非家族企業有較低的投資現金流量敏感度，其原因在於家族企業面臨較低的融資成本以及經理人與股東之間的代理成本。然而，隨著家族所有權的集中，在家族股權中度集中下，其投資現金流量敏感度反而提升，出現大、小股東之間的代理問題與管理者據守的現象。以管理型態來做為干擾變數探討其對家族持股與投資現金流量敏感度關係的影響時，發現家族企業在董事長兼任總經理(CEO duality)的情況下會降低投資現金流量敏感度，支持忠僕理論(stewardship theory)。

摘要(英)

We investigate the relationship between family businesses and investment-cash flow sensitivity in Taiwan— an economy that is characterized by a high degree of ownership in general and predominant family control in particular. Family business may not only reduce investment-cash flow sensitivity because of family control mitigating agency and asymmetric information problems but also
increase investment-cash flow sensitivity for moderate levels of family ownership. Investment-cash flow sensitivity is lower in family-controlled firms with CEO duality, supporting the stewardship theory. Our results suggest that family control would be effective in mitigating investment distortions, but the entrenchment effect of the above-mentioned situations can aggravate investment distortions. CEO duality could reinforce a stewardship role in family firms.

關鍵字(中)

★ 投資現金流量敏感度
★ 雙重領導結構
★ 家族企業
★ 家族所有權

關鍵字(英)

★ Investment-cash flow sensitivity
★ Family businesses
★ Family ownership
★ CEO duality

論文目次

Contents
Abstract in Chinese ......................................i
Abstract ................................................ii
Acknowledgements....................................... iii
Contents................................................ iv
List of Table ............................................v
Chapter 1 Introduction ...................................1
1-1 Research Background ..................................1
1-2 Research Purpose .....................................3
1-3 Results Preview ......................................5
Chapter 2 Literature Review.............................. 6
2-1 Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivity in Family Business.. 6
2-2 Family Ownership and Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivity.8
2-3 Moderating Role of Managerial Entrenchment...........10
Chapter 3 Data Description and Empirical Specification.. 12
3-1 Sample Selection ....................................12
3-2 Empirical Specification..............................14
3-3 Descriptive Statistics...............................16
Chapter 4 Empirical Results..............................18
4-1 Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivity in Family Business..18
4-2 Relation Between Family Ownership and Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivity.........................................20
4-3 Results of Managerial Entrenchment ..................22
4-4 The Effect of Financial Constraints .................24
Chapter 5 Robustness Tests ..............................28
5-1 The Information Set of Expected and Surprise components ..............................................28
5-2 Noise in Cash Flow.................................. 30
5-3 Excess Cash .........................................32
5-4 Transparency ........................................33
Chapter 6 Conclusion ....................................36
6-1 Discussion ..........................................36
6-2 Theoretical and Practitioner Implications ...........37
6-3 Future Research .....................................37
References...............................................38

參考文獻

References
﹝1﹞Alti, A., “How sensitive is investment to cash flow when financing is frictionless?”Journal of Finance, Vol 63, pp. 707-722, 2003.
﹝2﹞Ali, A., Chen ,T.Y. and Radhakrishnan, S.,“Corporate disclosures by family firms”, Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol 44, pp. 238-286, 2007.
﹝3﹞Anderson, R., Mansi, S. and Reeb, D.,“Founding family ownership and the agency costs of debt”, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol 68, pp.263-285, 2003.
﹝4﹞Anderson, R.C. and Reeb, D.M., “Founding-family ownership and firm performance: Evidence form the S&P 500”, Journal of Finance, Vol 58, pp.1301-1329, 2003.
﹝5﹞Aronoff, C. E. and Ward, J. L., “Family-owned businesses: A thing of the past or a model of the future?” Family Business Review, Vol 8, pp. 121-130, 1995.
﹝6﹞Baker, M., Stein, J. C. and Wurgler, J., “When dose the market matter? Stock price and the investment of equity-dependent firms”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol 118, pp. 969-1006, 2003.
﹝7﹞Barth, M. E., Landsman, W. R. and Rendleman Jr. R. J., “Implementation of an option pricing-based bond valuation model for corporate debt and its components”,
Accounting Horizons, Vol 14, pp. 455-479, 2000.
﹝8﹞Biddle, G. C. and Hilary, G., “Accounting quality and firm-level capital investment",The Accounting Review, Vol 81, pp. 963-982, 2006.
﹝9﹞Bushman, R. M., Smith, A. J. and Zhang, F.,“Investment-cash flow sensitivities are really investment-investment sensitivities”, SSRN working paper, April 2008.
39
﹝10﹞ Claessens, S., Djankov, S., Fan J. and Lang, L.H., “The separation of ownership and control in East Asian corporations”, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol 58, pp.
81-112, 2000.
﹝11﹞ Claessens, S., Djankov, S., Fan, J. and Lang, L. H., “Disentangling the incentive and entrenchment effects of large shareholdings”, Journal of Finance, Vol 57, pp.
2741-2772, 2002.
﹝12﹞ Davis, J., Schoorman, R. and Donaldson L.,“Towards a stewardship theory of management,” Academy of Management Review, Vol 22, pp. 20-47, 1997.
﹝13﹞ Deloof, M., “Internal capital markets, bank borrowing, and financing constraints:Evidence from Belgian firms”, Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Vol 25,
pp. 945-968, 1998.
﹝14﹞ Demsetz, H. and Lehn, K., “The structure of corporate ownership: Causes and consequences”, Journal of Political Economy, Vol 93, pp. 1155-1177, 1985.
﹝15﹞ Erickson, T. and Whited, T. M., “Measurement error and the relationship between investment and q”, Journal of Political Economy, Vol 108, pp. 1027-1057, 2000.
﹝16﹞ Faccio, M. and Lang, L., “The ultimate ownership of Western European corporations”, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol 65, pp. 365-395, 2002.
﹝17﹞ Fama, E. and Jensen, M., “Agency problems and residual claims”, Journal of Law and Economics, Vol 26, pp. 325-344. 1983.
﹝18﹞ Fazzari, S. M., Hubbard, R. G. and Petersen, B. C., “Financing constraints and corporate investment”, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Vol 1, pp. 141-195,
40,1988.
﹝19﹞ Finkelstein, S. and Hambrick, D., Strategic leadership: Top executives and their
effects on organizations, West Publishing Company, 1996.
﹝20﹞ Florou A., “Top director shake-up: The link between chairman and CEO dismissal in the UK”, Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Vol 32, pp. 97-128, 2005.
﹝21﹞ Goergen, M. and Renneboog, L., “Investment policy, internal financing and ownership concentration in the UK”, Journal of Corporate Finance, Vol 7,pp.
257-284, 2001.
﹝22﹞ Gomez-Mejin, Nunez-Nickel, L. M. and Gutierrez, I., “The role of family ties in agency contracts”, Academy of Management Journal, Vol 44, pp. 81-95, 2001.
﹝23﹞ Grossman, S. J. & Hart, O. D., “Corporate financial structure and managerial incentives”. In McCall J. J. (Ed.), The Economics of Information and Uncertainty,
University of Chicago Press, 1982.
﹝24﹞ Hadlock, C. J., “Ownership, liquidity, and investment”, The Rand Journal of Economics, Vol 29, pp. 487-508, 1998.
﹝25﹞ Hoffman J., Hoelscher, M. and Sorenson, R., “Achieving sustained competitive advantage: A family capital theory”, Family Business Review, Vol 12, pp.135-145,2006.
﹝26﹞ Hoshi, T., Kashyap, A.K.. and Scharfstein, D., “Corporate structure, liquidity, and investment: Evidence from Japanese industrial group”, Quarterly Journal of
Economics, Vol 106, pp.33-60, 1991.
﹝27﹞ Hubbard, R. G., “Capital-market imperfections and investment”, Journal of Economic Literature, Vol 36, pp. 193-225, 1998.
﹝28﹞ Hung J.H. and Chen, H.J., “Minimum shareholding requirements for insiders:Evidence form Taiwanese SMEs”, Corporate Governance: An International Review,Vol 17, pp. 35-46, 2009.
﹝29﹞ Jensen M. and Meckling, W., “Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Capital Structure”, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol 3, pp. 305-360,
1976.
﹝30﹞ Jensen M. C., “Agency costs and free cash flow, corporate finance and takeovers”, American Economic Review, Vol 76, pp. 659-665, 1986.
﹝31﹞ Jensen M., Self-interest, altruism, incentives, and agency: Foundations of organization strategy, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA., 1998.
﹝32﹞ Johnson, S., La Porta ,R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F. and Shleifer, A., “Tunnelling”, American Economic Review, Vol 90, pp. 22-27, 2000.
﹝33﹞ Lamont, O., Polk, C. and Saa-Requejo, J., “Financial constraints and stock returns”, Review of Financial Studies, Vol 14, pp. 529-554, 2001.
﹝34﹞ Lamont, O., “Cash flow and investment: Evidence from internal capital markets”, Journal of Finance, 52, pp.83-109, 1997.
﹝35﹞ La Porta, R., Lopez-De-Silanes, F. and Shleifer, A., “Corporate ownership around the world”, Journal of Finance, Vol 54, pp.471-517, 1999.
﹝36﹞ La Porta, R., Lopez-De-Silanes, F. and Shleifer, A., “Investor protection and corporate governance”, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol 58, pp. 3-27, 2000.
﹝37﹞ Malmendier, U. and Tate, G., “CEO overconfidence and corporate investment”, Journal of Finance, Vol 60, pp. 2661-2700, 2005.
﹝38﹞ Marquardt, C. A. and Wiedman, C. I., “The effect of earnings management on the value relevance of accounting information”, Journal of Business Review &
Accounting, Vol 31, pp.297-332, 2004.
﹝39﹞ McConnell, J. and Servaes, H., “Additional evidence on equity ownership and corporate value”, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol 27, pp. 595-612, 1990.
﹝40﹞ Miller D. and Le Brenton-Miller, I., “Family governance and firm performance: Agency, stewardship, and capabilities”, Family Business Review, Vol 19, pp.73-87,
2006.
﹝41﹞ Modigliani, F. and Miller, M. H., “The cost of capital, corporation finance and the theory of investment”, American Economic Review, Vol 48, pp. 261-297, 1958.
﹝42﹞ Morck, R., Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R., “Management ownership and market valuation,” Journal of Financial Economics, Vol 20, pp. 293-315, 1988.
﹝43﹞ Morck, R. and Yeung, B., “Agency problems in large family business groups”,
Entrepreneurship, Theory and Practice, pp. 367-382, 2003.
﹝44﹞ Morck, R., Wolfenzon, D. and Yeung, B., “Corporate governance, economic entrenchment, and growth”, Journal of Economic Literature, Vol 43, pp. 655-720, 2005.
﹝45﹞ Moyen, N., “Investment-cash flow sensitivities: Constrained versus unconstrained firms,” Journal of Finance, Vol 59, pp. 2061-2092, 2004.
﹝46﹞ Muth, M. M. and Donaldson, L. “Stewardship theory and board structure: a contingency approach”, Corporate Governance, Vol 6, pp.5-28, 1998.
﹝47﹞ Myers, S.C. and Majluf, N., “Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have investment information that investors do not have”, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol 13, pp. 87-220., 1984.
﹝48﹞ Newey, W. and McFadden, D. L., “Large sample estimation and hypothesis testing,”In Handbook of Econometrics, edited by Robert F. Engle and D. L. McFadden.
Amsterdam: North-Holland, Vol 4, 1994.
﹝49﹞ Opler, T. L., Pinkowitz, L. Stulz, R. and Williamson, R., “The determinants and implications of corporate cash holding”, Journal of Financial Economic, Vol 52, pp.3-46, 1999.
﹝50﹞ Pawlina, G. and Renneboog, L., “Is investment-cash flow sensitivity caused by agency costs or asymmetric information? Evidence from the UK”, European Financial Management, Vol 11, pp. 483-513, 2005.
﹝51﹞ Peng, W. Q. and Wei, K.C John, “Women executives and corporate investment:Evidence from the S&P 1500”, Working paper, 2006.
﹝52﹞ Pindado, J. and de la Torre, C., “Effect of ownership structure on underinvestment and overinvestment: empirical evidence from Spain”, Accounting and Finance, Vol 49, pp. 363-383, 2009.
﹝53﹞ Richardson, S., “Over-investment of free cash flow”, Review of Accounting Studies,Vol 11, pp. 159-89, 2006.
﹝54﹞ Rajan, R.G. and Zingales, L., “The governance of the new enterprise”, SSRN working paper, 2000.
﹝55﹞ Schulze, W.S., Lubatkin, M. H. Dino, R.N. and Buchholtz, A. K. “Agency relationships in family firms: Theory and evidence”, Organization Science, Vol 12,
pp.99-116, 2001.
﹝56﹞ Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R. W., “A survey of corporate governance”, Journal of Finance, Vol 52, pp. 737-783, 1997.
﹝57﹞ Stein, J. C., “Takeover threats and managerial myopia”, The Journal of Political Economy, Vol 96, pp.61-80, 1988.
﹝58﹞ Stulz, R. M., “Managerial discretion and optimal financing policies”, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol 26, pp.3-27, 1990.
﹝59﹞ Tirole, J., The theory of corporate finance, Princeton University Press, 2006.
﹝60﹞ Uzzi, B., “Social structure and competition in interfirm networks: The paradox of embeddedness”, Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol 42, pp. 35-67, 1997.
﹝61﹞ Villalonga, B. and Amit, R., “How do family ownership, control and management affect firm value?” Journal of Financial Economics, Vol 80, pp. 385-417, 2006.
﹝62﹞ Yeh Y. H., Lee, T. S. and Woidtke, T., “Family control and corporate governance: Evidence form Taiwan”, International Review of Finance, Vol 2, pp. 21-48, 2001.
﹝63﹞ Yeh Y. H. and Woidtke, T., “Commitment or entrenchment? Controlling
shareholders and board composition,” Journal of Banking & Finance, Vol 29, pp.
1857-1885, 2005.

指導教授

洪榮華(Jung-Hua Hung)

審核日期

2011-3-1

推文