認股權憑證發放條件對員工善意感知與留任意願之影響

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姓名

余夏華(Hsia-Hua Yu) 查詢紙本館藏

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人力資源管理研究所在職專班

論文名稱

認股權憑證發放條件對員工善意感知與留任意願之影響
(The Impact of Employee Stock Option Plans on Employee’s Perception of Goodwill and Intention to Retain)

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摘要(中)

本研究旨在探討我國現行法規與產業環境下，認股權憑證之發放條件對員工的善意感知及留任意願之影響。透過政策捕捉(policy capturing)方法，將三種發放條件，認股價格、權利期間、以及發放公司的產品生命週期，排列組合出8種員工認股權情境，以網路問卷形式調查知識經濟型產業研發人員在各情境中之善意感知及留任意願程度，並以ANOVA以及ANCOVA進行結果的變異數分析。結果顯示，低認股價格或短權利期間的設計，較能引發員工的善意感知及留任意願。而員工對認股權憑證所引發的善意感知與留任意願在不同的產業間並無差別。低認股價格搭配短權利期間，員工之善意感知與留任意願最佳；低認股價格搭配長權利期間或是高認股價格搭配短權利期間，兩種情境引發之反應居中；而高認股價格再加上長權利期間，員工之反應最弱。且權利期間與認股價格彼此間存在干擾作用，意即在權利期間較短的情形下，員工因認股價格所產生的善意感知與留任意願態度更佳。此外，雖然差異程度不大，但相較於新藥開發的研發人員，消費性電子產品公司的研發人員比較在意權利期間的設計。

摘要(英)

The purpose of this research is to study how the different employee stock option plan scenarios impact employee’s perception of goodwill and intention to retain in the specific regulatory and industrial environment of Taiwan. By policy capturing approach, the three dependent variables, executive price, time period, and product life cycle, were permuted and combined into eight employee stock option plan scenarios. The experiment was conducted as internet questionnaire for R&D staff of new economic industry to catch their perception of goodwill and intention to retain in the eight scenarios. The data were analyzed by ANOVA and ANCOVA. We found that lower executive price or shorter time period would induce better attitude. But the results of different industry are identical. No matter in what industry, employee has the best perception of goodwill and intention to retain when lower executive price and shorter time period were combined. On the other hand, scenarios with high price and long period, employees show the worst response. We also conclude that there are interaction between executive price and time period. It means, under the shorter time period condition, that employee would show better perception and intention about low executive price. Furthermore, R&D staffs in consumer electronic product company are more sensitive to the design of time period.

關鍵字(中)

★ 員工認股權憑證
★ 留任意願
★ 善意感知

關鍵字(英)

★ employee stock option
★ intention to retain
★ perception of goodwill

論文目次

一、緒論 1
1-1 研究背景與動機 1
1-2 研究目的 3
二、文獻探討 5
2-1. 員工股票獎酬概述 5
2-2. 我國股票獎酬概況 7
2-3. 員工認股權憑證概述與我國實施概況 9
2-4. 我國員工認股權憑證之發放條件 11
2-5. 認股權與員工之善意感知及留任意願 14
三、研究方法 17
3-1. 研究架構 17
3-2. 資料來源 18
3-3. 研究假設 19
3-4. 研究變項設計與衡量 20
3-5. 實驗設計 22
3-5-1. 實驗方法 22
3-5-2. 分析方法 23
四、研究結果與分析 24
4-1. 樣本特徵屬性分析 24
4-2. 發放條件與員工善意感知關係探討 26
4-3. 發放條件與員工留任意願關係 30
4-4. 假設檢定 35
五、結論與建議 36
5-1. 結論 36
5-2. 管理意涵 38
5-3. 研究限制 40
5-3-1. 實驗方法限制 40
5-3-2. 受測者樣本特性 40
5-3-3. 受測者資訊不足 40
5-4. 後續研究建議 40
六、參考文獻 41

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指導教授

劉念琪(Nien-Chi Liu)

審核日期

2011-7-9

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