股權分置改革對中國公司的權益資金成本影響之研究

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劉芳孜(Fang-tzu Liu) 查詢紙本館藏

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企業管理學系

論文名稱

股權分置改革對中國公司的權益資金成本影響之研究
(China's Split Share Structure Reform and cost of equity capital：Evidence from Chinese listed companies)

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摘要(中)

考量中國大陸與其他國家公司治理環境之差異，加上中國有實施股權分置改革，本研究以1996年到2009年之中國上市公司作為研究對象，除探討公司治理對中國上市公司權益資金成本的影響外，亦檢測在股權分置改革前後以及區分有無跨境上市公司的權益資金成本是否有顯著的變化。PLS(Panel Least Squares) 和OLS(Ordinary Least Squares)迴歸分析的結果發現，在股權分置改革後權益資金成本並無顯著下降，表示股權分置改革可能沒有降低權益資金成本的效果；在2004年股改前，跨境上市的公司與沒有跨境上市的公司，權益資金成本有顯著差異；進一步檢視，發現權益資金成本的下降可能來自於第二大股東持股比例的下降與獨立董事比例的提高，亦即跨境後，企業的公司治理環境的改善的確有助於降低權益資金成本。最後，已跨境上市公司再經歷股權分置改革，其權益資金成本顯著高於未參與股改的跨境公司。顯示企業選擇跨境後，本身的公司治理環境已有所提升，因此股改非但無法達到權益資金成本下降的效果，反而可能使權益資金成本上升。本研究之實證結果希望能提供政策制定者提升公司治理品質、降低企業的權益資金成本或是實施制度改革前的參考。

摘要(英)

Considering the differences of corporate governance environment between China and other countries and Chinese authorities have launched Split Share Structure Reform program in 2005. This study investigates the relationship between corporate governance and cost of equity capital, using China’’s listed corporations from 1996 to 2009 as sample observations. We use PLS(Panel Least Squares) and OLS(Ordinary Least Squares) regressions to examine our hypotheses and the results are as follows：First, the cost of equity capital of firms that participate in Split Share Structure Reform decreases insignificantly than their counterparts. Second, before Split Share Structure Reform, cross-listed firms have significantly lower cost of equity capital than non-cross-listed firms in China, and the causes come from lower proportion of shares of second large shareholder and higher proportion of independent board members. Finally, cross-listed firms who participate in Split Share Structure Reform have significantly higher cost of equity capital than those who do not participate in Split Share Structure Reform. Our research has implications for regulators who want to improve corporate governance and reduce firm’’s cost of equity capital.

關鍵字(中)

★ 股權分置改革
★ 權益資金成本
★ 公司治理

關鍵字(英)

★ Split Share Structure Reform
★ corporate governance
★ cost of equity capital

論文目次

摘要…………………………………………………………………………………….i
Abstract……………………………………………………………………………..…ii
目錄…………………………………………………………………………………...iii
表目錄………………………………………………………………………………...iv
第一章緒論…………………………………..…………………………………..…1
第二章文獻探討與研究假說…………………………………….....………..….…4
2-1股權分置改革前後，單一發行A股企業的權益資金成本變動……………4
2-2中國大陸企業有無跨境上市對權益資金成本的影響………….………….7
2-3股權分置改革與跨境上市對權益資金成本影響的比較………….……….9
第三章研究設計………………………..………………….…………...................11
3-1樣本篩選與資料來源………………………..……………………………..11
3-2變數衡量……………………..……………………......................................12
3-3模型建立……………………..……………………......................................16
第四章實證結果與分析………………………..……………………………..…..17
4-1敘述性統計分析與相關係數分析…………………………………………17
4-2股改前後公司治理對權益資金成本之實證結果…………………………26
4-3有無跨境上市其公司治理對權益資金成本之實證結果…………………28
4-4有無實施股權分置改革其公司治理對權益資金成本之實證結果………30
4-5 穩健性測試………………..………………………………………..……...32
第五章結論與建議………………..………………………………………………34
5-1結論與實證意涵………………..………………………………………..…34
5-2研究限制與後續研究建議……..………………………………………..…34
參考文獻………………..…………………………………………………..………..36
附錄一穩健性測試結果……………………………………………..……………..39

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指導教授

洪榮華、陳香如(Jung-hua Hung)

審核日期

2011-6-20

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