往來密切程度對企業借款利差與資本投資之影響

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姓名

陳彥芝(Yen-chih Chen) 查詢紙本館藏

畢業系所

財務金融學系

論文名稱

往來密切程度對企業借款利差與資本投資之影響

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摘要(中)

本文的目的在於了解近十年來台灣金融市場歷經了改革與開放、卡債風暴、金融海嘯等重大總體事件後，企業的借款利差，是否被銀行或企業本身、往來關係等因素而有所影響，再來針對企業的風險高低做探討，接著第二部分在於研究銀行在借款給企業後，企業是否有融資限制的情形乃至影響其資本投資增額，研究對象以西元2000至2010年之間新承做的借款資料為依據。
　　實證結果發現，借款利差部分，以銀行面的構面而言，當借款銀行為民營非金控銀行或為企業的最大債權銀行，其給予企業的借款利率較低，若借款銀行屬外資銀行，則借款利率較高；企業屬性方面，若公司規模越大、獲利比率越高、高風險企業之信用評等有調升的情形或為上市上櫃之企業，則能得到較低之借款利率，相反地，若前三年信用評等調降或本身為高信用風險等級的企業，其借款利率較高；高風險的借款者若能在借款時提供擔保品，則能顯著獲得較低之利率。資本投資增額部分，研究結果顯示國內企業偏好使用內部資金投資，且支持自由現金流量假說，當企業向民營非控銀行與外資銀行借款，資本投資增額較低，且較偏向使用內部資金；上市公司資本投資增額較高，偏好使用外部資金，規模越大之企業反而投資增額越少。

摘要(英)

This research is a study about firms loan rate and investment after financial restricting in Taiwan, the sample period is from 2000 to 2010, the influence effect including the structure of back, company and corporate-bank relationship, then we focus on the behavior of high credit risk firms.
　　We made use of regression models to go through the empirical analysis of our research, and the evidence shows that when firms borrow from banks belong to domestic financial holdings and their major banks, their loan rate will be lower, but if banks are foreign banks then loan rate will be higher. As for firms characteristics, if firms size and their cost divide by income was higher or their credit rate used to be lower but got upgrade lately, and if they belong to listed or public company, then their loan rate tend to be lower than others. By contrast, if firms belong to higher credit risk or their ratings downgrade lately, their loan rate will be higher, in addition, we found that when high risk firms provided collateral in the process of lending, they could get lower loan rate. In the case of investment, the evidence shows that the financial constraint situation exists in Taiwan, and free cash flow hypothesis was supported. When firms borrow capital from private domestic banks or foreign banks, they raise their investment and tend to use external funds, and then if firms were listed company that they also tend to use external funds.

關鍵字(中)

★ 信用評等
★ 融資限制
★ 投資決策
★ 借款利差
★ 往來關係
★ 主要往來銀行

關鍵字(英)

★ credit rating
★ banking relationship
★ financing constraints
★ investment decisions
★ major banks
★ Loan rate

論文目次

第壹章　緒論　1
　第一節　研究動機　1
　第二節　研究目的　3
第貳章文獻回顧　4
　第一節　企業借款利差之影響因素　4
　第二節　往來密切程度對銀行授信之影響　5
　第三節　融資限制對資本投資之影響 6
第參章研究方法 8
　第一節　選樣設計　8
　第二節　變數定義與實證模型　8
　　一、往來密切程度對企業借款利差之影響　8
　　二、往來密切程度對企業資本投資之影響　17
第肆章實證分析與結果　23
　第一節　敘述統計分析　23
　第二節　實證分析結果　30
　　一、往來密切程度對企業借款利差之影響　30
　　二、往來密切程度對企業資本投資之影響　38
　　三、不同所有權類型銀行的企業借款利差與資本投資的差異性檢定　46
第伍章　結論與建議　49
　第一節　結論　49
　第二節　未來研究建議　50
參考文獻　52
附錄　附表7-附表10 58

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指導教授

陳錦村(Jing-twen Chen)

審核日期

2011-7-2

推文