公司治理與現金持有之關係－中國大陸上市公司股改前後之實證研究

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姓名

紀松佑(Sung-Yu Chi) 查詢紙本館藏

畢業系所

企業管理學系在職專班

論文名稱

公司治理與現金持有之關係－中國大陸上市公司股改前後之實證研究
(Corporate governance and cash holdings- Before and after the split share structure reform in China listed companies.)

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摘要(中)

中國大陸與歐美國家大不相同，上市公司大多屬於國有企業(State-Owned Enterprises; SOEs )轉型而來，普遍存在股權結構較集中、流動性差、一股獨大現象。本研究旨在探討在這樣的特殊背景之下，公司治理變數如何影響公司現金持有政策。本研究採用2001年至2009年期間，中國公開上市公司的公司治理的縱、橫斷面資料(Panel data)，探討影響現金持有之相關因素。此外，分成兩個時期，2005年股權分置改革前(2001年至2004年)與改革後(2006年至2009年)，以檢視此改革對公司現金持有決策產生之影響。公司治理部分，分別針對董事會特徵與股權結構進行分析。實證結果發現，股權分制改革前，董事會特徵未對企業現金持有水準產生顯著影響。股改後，外部獨立董事席次比例與現金持有轉為顯著負相關，顯示外部監督機制發揮作用。在股權結構部分，股改前，內部人持股比例與現金持有呈顯著正相關，機構投資人與國家持股比例皆與現金持有呈顯著負相關。股改後，內部人持股比例與現金持有轉為顯著負相關，國家持股比例則與現金持有轉為顯著正相關。

摘要(英)

Listed companies in Mainland China are very different from those in Western countries in that most of them are state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and have unique characteristics. This study examines whether the effects of corporate governance on cash holdings for Chinese listed firms have changes caused by the split share structure reform. The sample includes the data between 2001 and 2009 collected from the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges. The empirical results show that, after the reform, both the proportion of independent directors and the insider ownership are significantly and negatively related to corporate cash holdings, implying that some of the corporate governance mechanisms are enhanced after the reform. However, the state ownership still has a positive correlation with cash holdings after the reform.

關鍵字(中)

★ 現金持有
★ 公司治理
★ 股權分置改革

關鍵字(英)

★ Corporate governance
★ Cash holdings
★ Split share structure reform

論文目次

摘要 i
Abstract ii
誌謝 iii
目錄 iv
表目錄 vi
第一章緒論 1
1-1 研究動機與目的 1
1-2 大陸股權分置改革 2
1-3 研究架構 3
第二章文獻探討與假說建立 4
2-1 董事會特徵與現金持有之關係 4
2-1-1 董事會規模 4
2-1-2 董事長兼任總經理 5
2-1-3 外部獨立董事席次 7
2-2 股權結構與現金持有之關係 8
2-2-1 內部人持股 8
2-2-2 機構投資人持股 10
2-2-3 國家持股 11
第三章研究設計 13
3-1 樣本篩選與資料來源 13
3-2 變數衡量 13
3-2-1 應變數之衡量 14
3-2-2 自變數之衡量 14
3-2-3 其他公司特性控制變數 16
3-3 研究分析方法 19
3-3-1 敘述性統計分析 19
3-3-2 迴歸分析 19
第四章實證結果與分析 21
4-1 敘述性統計分析與相關係數分析 21
4-2 實證迴歸分析 28
4-2-1 董事會特徵之實證結果 28
4-2-2 股權結構之實證結果 28
4-2-3 控制變數之實證結果 30
4-3 穩健性測試 34
4-3-1 董事會特徵與股權結構個別檢驗 34
4-3-2 股改當年度資料納入檢驗 36
第五章結論與建議 38
5-1 結論 38
5-2 研究限制 39
5-3 建議 39
5-3-1 政府及企業決策建議 39
5-3-2 後續研究建議 40
參考文獻 41

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指導教授

洪榮華(Jung-Hua Hung)

審核日期

2012-7-9

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