股權分置改革對於中國上市公司現金持有動機之影響

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詹國弘(Guo-Hong Zhan) 查詢紙本館藏

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企業管理學系

論文名稱

股權分置改革對於中國上市公司現金持有動機之影響
(The impact of the split share structure reform on Chinese listed firms’ motives for cash holdings)

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摘要(中)

本文主要探討股權分置改革如何影響現金持有動機。本研究分別就國有企
業與非國有企業，檢測股權分置改革對於現金持有的兩大動機－預防動機與代理
動機之影響。本研究以在深圳證券交易所與上海證券交易所上市的公司為研究對
象，研究年份從 2001 至 2011 共 11,437 個觀察值。研究結果顯示，國有企業在
股權分置改革後，現金持有的預防動機與代理動機皆減少。非國有企業則是在股
權分置改革後，現金持有的預防動機增加，而代理動機減少。我們也將國有企業
分為中央政府控制企業與地方政府控制企業，以檢測現金持有動機上於股權分置
改革後是否有不同的改變，結果顯示二者在代理動機上皆減少，但中央企業預防
動機並無明顯改變，而地方企業則是顯著減少。

摘要(英)

This study examines how the split share structure reform affects cash holding
motives of Chinese listed firms. We divided the whole sample into state controlled
firms and non-state controlled ones to examine the impact of the split share structure
reform on cash holding motives of these two different types of firms. The sample
includes companies listed in Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzeng Stock Exchange
from 2001 to 2011, with a total of 11,437 firm-year observations. Our empirical
results show that the agency motive and precautionary motive of state controlled firms
decrease after the split share structure reform. In non-state controlled firms, the
precautionary motive increases but the agency motive decreases after the reform. We
further divided state controlled firm into firms controlled by local government and by
central government. We examined these two types of state controlled firms and found
that decrease in agency motive happened to both of these companies. However,
opposite to local government controlled firms, there is no significant effect on
precautionary motive in central government controlled firms.

關鍵字(中)

★ 預防動機
★ 代理動機
★ 現金持有
★ 股權分置改革

關鍵字(英)

論文目次

iii

目錄
論文摘要........................................................................................................................ I
ABSTRACT .................................................................................................................. II
第一章緒論................................................................................................................ 1
第二章文獻探討與假說建立.................................................................................... 4
第一節股權分置改革與現金持有的預防動機.................................................... 4
一、國有企業的現金持有預防動機與股權分置改革........................................ 4
二、非國有企業的現金持有預防動機與股權分置改革.................................... 7
第二節股權分置改革與現金持有的代理動機.................................................... 8
一、國有企業的現金持有代理動機與股權分置改革........................................ 8
二、非國有企業的現金持有代理動機與股權分置改革.................................. 11
第三章研究方法...................................................................................................... 15
第一節研究對象與資料來源.............................................................................. 15
第二節研究設計與變數定義.............................................................................. 15
一、模型設計...................................................................................................... 15
二、現金持有動機的衡量與控制變數.............................................................. 17
第四章實證結果與分析............................................................................................ 20
第一節基本敘述性統計分析 ................................................................................ 20
第二節多變量分析結果 ........................................................................................ 26
一、股改對於國有企業現金持有動機之影響.................................................. 26
二、股改對於非國有企業現金持有動機之影響.............................................. 28
三、股改對不同控制人身分現金持有動機之影響.......................................... 30
第三節穩健性分析 ................................................................................................ 33
一、不同超額現金之穩健性分析...................................................................... 33 二、不同股改定義之穩健性分析...................................................................... 43
第五章結論與建議.................................................................................................... 47
參考文獻...................................................................................................................... 49

參考文獻

49

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指導教授

洪榮華、林翠蓉

審核日期

2013-6-28

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