控制股東與關係人交易的關係-中國股權分置改革的實證研究

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姓名

蔡子傑(Choi, Chi-kit) 查詢紙本館藏

畢業系所

企業管理學系

論文名稱

控制股東與關係人交易的關係-中國股權分置改革的實證研究
(Controlling shareholders and related party transactions: Evidence from the split share structure reform in China)

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摘要(中)

中國政府於2005年實施股權分置改革，期望藉此平衡非流通股東及流通股東的利益，減少控制股東剝奪少數股東財富的誘因。考量以關係人交易作為剝奪及輸送利益的工具，股權分置改革應該對控制股東之關係人交易產生影響。本文針對2002年至2009年間在深圳交易所及上海交易所之上市公司進行研究，利用OLS迴歸模型檢驗，股權分置改革後對以下不同類型的控制股東進行關係人交易之影響：國有、非國有、中央政府、地方政府、境外機構投資人及境內機構投資人；此外，檢測改革前後第二大股東對於控制股東進行關係人交易之影響。實證發現國有控制股東在股權分置改革後減少進行關係人交易的下降幅度比非國有股東多；中央政府在股權分置改革後減少進行關係人交易的下降幅度比地方政府多；第二大股東在非國有控制股東下較能抑制控制股東進行關係人交易。

摘要(英)

Chinese government implemented the split share structure reform in 2005, with an attempt to eliminate controlling shareholders’ incentive to expropriate the minority shareholders’ wealth through aligning the interest of controlling shareholders and minority shareholders. Related party transaction is one of the common ways for tunneling, which might be affected by the split share structure reform. Our sample observations include all companies listed on the Shenzhen and the Shanghai Stock Exchange during the years from 2002 to 2010. The OLS regression models are used to investigate the impact of split share structure reform on related party transitions, considering the following different types of controlling shareholders: state owned, non-state owned, central government, local government, foreign institutional investors and local institutional investors. We also investigate the monitoring effects of the second largest shareholder.
The empirical results show that related party transactions are reduced after the split share structure reform, especially in firms controlled by state owned shareholders and central government. Finally, the split share structure reform enhances the monitoring effects of the second largest shareholder in firms controlled by non-state owned shareholders.

關鍵字(中)

★ 中國
★ 關係人交易
★ 控制股東
★ 第二大股東

關鍵字(英)

★ China
★ related party transaction
★ controlling shareholder
★ second largest shareholder

論文目次

中文摘要..................................................i
英文摘要..................................................ii
目錄....................................................iii
表目錄...................................................iv
一、緒論 ... ............................................1
二、文獻探討及研究假說 ....................................5
2-1 國家所有權與關係人交易..................................5
2-2 中央政府、地方地府所有權與關係人交易.......................9
2-3 境內機構投資人、境外機構投資人控制權與關係人交易............ 11
2-4 第二大股東身份與關係人交易...............................13
三、資料及研究方法 ........................................15
3-1 資料來源..............................................15
3-2控制股東及第二大股東分類..................................16
3-3 實證模型..............................................16
四、實證結果與分析 .........................................20
4-1 敍述性統計分析.........................................20
4-2 實證結果..............................................24
4-3 穩建性測試.............................................37
五、結論 ................................................38
參考文獻 ..................................................40

參考文獻

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指導教授

洪榮華、李易政

審核日期

2013-7-1

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