公司治理、高階經理人薪酬與企業績效敏感度之關連性

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溫嬿儒(Yan-Ru Wen) 查詢紙本館藏

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會計研究所

論文名稱

公司治理、高階經理人薪酬與企業績效敏感度之關連性
(Corporate Governance, the Relationship between Executive Compensation and Firm Performance in Taiwan)

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摘要(中)

本研究旨在探討台灣強制設立薪酬委員會後，公司治理好對高階經理人現金薪酬與會計績效敏感度之影響為何，以及進一步檢驗不同之公司特色，是否會增加或減弱公司治理好對高階經理人現金薪酬與會計績效敏感度之關係。
本研究使用970筆台灣公開上市櫃公司為樣本，並以2011年為樣本年，建構回歸模型進行驗證。實證結果發現，以控制權與盈餘分配權偏離程度小代理良好的公司治理，公司治理好可能對高階經理人現金薪酬與會計績效之敏感度有正向之效果，與過去文獻一致。然而，以公司成長機會高低將樣本分組後發現，高成長性公司特色，不會顯著減弱公司治理好對高階經理人現金薪酬會計績效敏感度之正向關係。推估原因可能為台灣2008年1月1日施行「員工分紅費用化」後的影響，造成高成長性的公司，不再如同過往依賴權益薪酬激勵高階經理人所致。另一方面，將樣本以公司盈虧狀態分組後發現，營業虧損之公司特色，會顯著減弱公司治理好對高階經理人現金薪酬會計績效敏感度之正向關係，與過去文獻結論一致。

摘要(英)

This research is going to discuss the effect of good corporate governance on the connections between executive cash compensation and accounting performance after Taiwan listed companies are forced to establish compensation committee. This research further investigates on whether the effects will differ or not by sampling in different firms characteristics.
The study is conducted with use of 970 samples of the Taiwan listed companies in 2011 and constructs multiple regression models for examination. The practical examination indicates that, if small separation of control and cash-flow rights represents good corporate governance, the effect of good corporate governance could be positive to the sensitivity of executive cash compensation to accounting performance which complies with result found in past literature review.
However, after dividing the sample by firm’s growth opportunities, the result shows that high-growth companies would not lessen the positive effect of good corporate governance on the pay-performance sensitivity. The reason may refer to the implementation of Expensing Employee Bonuses policy in 2008 that high-growth firms would not rely on equity-based compensation to motive executives as before.
On the other hand, after grouping the sample into firm’s earnings status, the result shows that the positive effect of good corporate governance on the pay-performance sensitivity is significantly weakened by loss-making firms. The result is again consists with past findings.

關鍵字(中)

★ 公司治理
★ 公司特色
★ 薪資報酬委員會
★ 經理人薪酬
★ 薪酬績效敏感度

關鍵字(英)

★ Corporate Governance
★ the Characteristics of Firms
★ Compensation Committee
★ Executive Compensation
★ Pay-Performance Sensitivity

論文目次

摘要 I
ABSTRACT II
致謝辭 III
目錄 IV
圖目錄 V
表目錄 VIII
一、緒論 1
1-1研究背景與動機 1
1-2 研究目的 4
1-3 研究架構 6
二、文獻探討與研究假說 8
2-1 薪酬委員會 8
2-2 公司治理、代理問題與高階經理人薪酬績效敏感度 12
2-3 公司特質、薪酬委員會品質與薪酬績效敏感度之關係 16
2-4 研究假說 19
三、研究方法 24
3-1 研究樣本資料來源與選取 24
3-2 變數定義 24
3-3 實證模型 33
四、實證結果與分析 39
4-1 敘述性統計分析 39
4-2 相關係數分析 41
4-3 多元回歸分析與說明 43
4-4 敏感性測試 49
五、結論與建議 54
5-1 研究結果 54
5-2 研究限制 55
5-3 研究建議 55
參考文獻 56

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薛明玲，2003，由沙氏法案談我國會計監理制度，http://www.alberthsueh.com/index.php?load=readandid=60

指導教授

盧佳琪(Chia-Chi Lu)

審核日期

2013-7-23

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