獨立董事特性、高階經理人現金薪酬 與會計績效表現之關聯性

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姓名

林之閩(Chih-min Lin) 查詢紙本館藏

畢業系所

會計研究所

論文名稱

獨立董事特性、高階經理人現金薪酬與會計績效表現之關聯性
(The Relationship between Independent Director Characteristics, CEO Cash Compensation and Corporate Performance)

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至系統瀏覽論文 ( 永不開放)

摘要(中)

本研究之發想是來自Vafeas (1999) 及Sun and Cahan (2009) 兩篇文獻，前者係探討企業在遴選薪委會成員時偏好選用資歷較深、年齡較長、兼任情況較少之獨立董事，而後者發現當薪委會品質為顯著影響高階經理人現金薪酬反應會計績效表現敏感度之因素。
本研究係針對2014年9月底前，已由獨立董事組成薪委會之企業為樣本，探討這些企業在2010年至2011年間，高階經理人現金薪酬變動與會計績效變動之敏感度是否將受到獨立董事特質之影響，這些特質分別為獨立董事之兼任情形、年資、參與會議次數、兼任其他委員會成員情形等四項，以期作為企業未來聘任獨立董事加入薪委會時之參考。
本研究指出薪委會中獨立董事年資與獨立董事參與會議次數皆為正向提升薪委會品質，進而顯著加強高階經理人現金薪酬反應會計績效表現敏感度之獨立董事特質。

摘要(英)

This research is inspired from two articles, Vafeas (1999) and Sun and Cahan (2009). Vafeas (1999) discusses the determinants of company board committee membership; position seniority, age preference, and less additional board sites. Sun and Cahan (2009) describes the association between CEO cash compensation and accounting performance which are effected by the quality of the compensation committee. The quality of the compensation committee is therefore significantly affected by the characteristics of committee membership.
The target group of this research is the companies by which, the end of September 2014, their compensation committees are composed of independent directors. This essay evaluates if the association between CEO cash compensation and accounting performance are influenced by independent directors. Characteristics of "independent directors" are; additional board seats, position seniority, company meeting attendance frequency, and their membership of other committees.
This research finds that director tenure and frequency of attendance at company meetings are two important independent director characteristics. These two characteristics can improve the quality of the compensation committee as well as enhance the association between CEO cash compensation and accounting performance. Therefore, as mentioned, the quality of the compensation committee is significantly affected by the characteristics of committee membership and can only benefit from annual research.

關鍵字(中)

★ 薪酬委員會品質
★ 獨立董事特質
★ 高階經理人總現金薪酬

關鍵字(英)

★ Compensation Committee Quality
★ Independent Director Characteristics
★ CEO Cash Compensation

論文目次

目錄
摘要 i
Abstract ii
致謝辭 iii
目錄 v
圖目錄 vi
表目錄 vii
第一章緒論 1
1-1 研究背景 1
1-2 研究動機 2
1-3 研究目的 2
1-4 論文架構 4
第二章文獻回顧 5
2-1 高階經理人薪酬 5
2-2 薪酬委員會 6
2-3 獨立董事 8
2-4 薪酬委員會品質與高階經理人薪酬連結性 10
2-5 獨立董事特性對薪酬委員會品質的影響 10
第三章研究設計 12
3-1 理論架構 12
3-2 研究假說 13
3-3 樣本選取 17
3-4 變數定義 17
3-5 實證模型 23
第四章實證結果與分析 26
4-1 敘述性統計分析 26
4-2 相關係數分析 27
4-3 迴歸分析結論 30
4-4 額外證實測試 36
第五章結論與建議 43
5-1 研究結論與意涵 43
5-2 研究限制與未來發展 44
參考文獻 45

參考文獻

參考文獻
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指導教授

盧佳琪(Chia-chi Lu)

審核日期

2013-7-15

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