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2. CASE A.請作答於白色標示單之答題本、CASE B.請作答於黃色標示單之答題本。

CASE A.(請作答於白色姓名標示單之答題本)

以下文章係今週刊轉載自 Business Week 有關 3M 公司的報導摘錄，請閱讀完後針對所提兩個問題表達您的看法：

不過幾年前，企業管理的最高殿堂非奇異(CE)莫屬。神殿的祭司是前奇異執行長傑克·威爾許(Jack Welch)，其門生將其口諭傳給世上管理界的所有信徒，其中最受外界關注的一名嫡傳弟子是詹姆斯·麥克納尼(James McNerney)。他在奇異角逐威爾許接班人失利後即獲明尼蘇達礦業公司(3M)禮聘為公司執行長。3M 董事會視麥克納尼為珍寶，在 2000 年 12 月 5 日宣部麥克納尼出任公司執行長的消息後，幾天內 3M 股價大漲將近兩成。

麥克納尼是這家百年老店首位外來的空降執行長，甚至還未踏入新東家一步，他就宣布說要對 3M 進行大改造，採用的正是純正的奇異兵法，麥克納尼裁掉八千名員工(約占總人力的 11%)，強化績效考核的過程，並使這家以出手闊綽為名的企業大幅縮減開支。他同時引進奇異自豪的六個標準差(Six Sigma)計畫—旨在減少產生缺失與提升效率的一系列管理手段，數以千計的職員都經培訓成為「黑帶級」的頂尖人才，該計畫似乎也發揮功效，麥克納尼讓牛皮的 3M 股價回復生機，並且為一個龐大懶散且管理無章法的組織導入了紀律，而獲得外界的稱許。

就在掌舵四年半後，麥克納尼跳槽至波音公司接掌營運兵符。而今，接替他在 3M 位置的繼任者面臨一項難題：過度強調效率是否已經讓 3M 成為一家不具創新能力的公司?對於一家當初是以創新起家的公司來說，這個問題非同小可，畢竟 3M 是催生皺紋紙膠帶、保溫棉與便利貼等產品的發明公司。

但自從推出接合 LCD 面板的多層光學薄膜產品之後，3M 已經好久沒有研發出可改變賽局的新技術。以往 3M 總是吹噓公司的營收至少有三分之一來自最近五年的新產品，如今新產品對營收的貢獻比重下滑至四分之一。

這樣的結果絕非偶然。六標準差這種效率計畫用意就在找出生產流程的問題，然後用精準的方法減少變因與去除缺失，但當這類的計畫被植入於像 3M 這樣的公司文化中，創意很容易遭到抹殺，再怎麼說，突破的創新都會挑戰既有的常規。

「發明的本質就是一種毫無定律可言的過程。」3M 現任執行長巴克利(George Buckley)說，他已經取消麥克納尼任內所實施的許多計畫，「你不可能在該領域實施六個標準差，好比說，嗯，我現在發明的進度落後，所以下週三要想出三個好點子，週五要再想出兩個，創意不是這樣子運作的。」麥克納尼則拒絕回應此篇報導。

傳統來說，六個標準差採用精準的統計分析所產生的資料，協助改善品質、降低成本與提升效率。曾與 3M 在發明計畫上有合作經驗的 MIT 史隆管理學院教授希波(Eric von Hippel)表示，這一套標準應用在發明上的問題相當大。他還說當六個標準差引進後，3M 的發明計畫都受到衝擊。

華爾街在乎的又是另外一回事。投資人喜歡麥克納尼提振獲利的方法，儘管這可能犧牲了創意。麥克納尼任內公司獲利平均一年成長 22%，在巴克利主政的第一年，營收來到 230 億美元，獲利達 14 億美元，但後來有兩季獲利低於市場預期，股價因而震盪走低，2007 年巴克利似乎成功的杜華爾街悠悠之口，讓他們相信在不破壞麥克納尼的生產力增長前提下，他能夠重新點燃營運成長的火花，自年初迄今，3M 股價上漲 12%。

討論問題(如果能用相關之理論來陳述您的論點更佳):

1. 3M 公司導入「六個標準差」的管理制度是否適當(請務必明確指出是或否)?並請詳細說明您認為適當或者不適當的理由。(25 分)
2. 追求效率與創新對 3M 而言似乎都相當重要，請問人力資源管理部門可以採用哪些措施協助 3M 同時達成這兩項組織目標?(25 分)

國立中央大學人力資源管理研究所九十七學年度碩士在職專班入學考試
考試科目：管理個案分析

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CASE B. (請作答於黃色姓名標示單之答題本)

“It’s no surprise that Schrempp is running the show. What is surprising is the way in which he is putting the two organizations together: forcing head-on confrontations, with the survivors left to run the company.”

- Time, May 24, 1999, commenting on Daimler-Chrysler CEO, Jurgen Schrempp’s style of management.

Daimler-Benz and Chrysler Corporation, two of the world’s leading car manufactures, agreed to combine their business in what they claimed to be a “merger of equals.” The DaimlerChrysler (DCX) merger took approximately one year to finalize. DCX generated revenues of \$155.3 billion and sold 4 million cars and trucks in 1998. Schrempp and Eaton jointly led the merged entity, as co-chairmen and co-CEOs. DCX sources were confident that the new company was well poised to exploit the growth opportunities offered by the global automotive market in terms of geographical and product segment coverage.

In order to make the merger a success, one of the most significant issues is the organizational culture. A cultural clash would be a major hurdle to the realization of the synergies identified before the merger. To minimize this clash of cultures, Schrempp decided to allow both groups to maintain their existing cultures. The former Chrysler group was given autonomy to manufacture mass-market cars and trucks, while the Germans continued to build luxury Mercedes. When Chrysler performed badly in 2000, its American president, James P Holden, was replaced with Dieter Zetsche from Germany. A few senior Chrysler executives had already left and more German executives were joining Chrysler at senior positions.

Daimler-Benz was characterized by methodical decision-making while Chrysler encourages creativity. Chrysler valued efficiency, empowerment, and fairly egalitarian relations among staff; whereas Daimler-Benz seemed to value respect for authority, bureaucratic precision, and centralized decision-making. The cultural differences soon became manifest in the daily activities of the company. For example, Chrysler executives quickly became frustrated with the attention Daimler-Benz executives gave to trivial matters, such as the shape of a pamphlet sent to employees. Daimler-Benz executives were equally confused when Eaton showed his emotions with tears in a speech to other executives. Chrysler was one of the leanest car companies in the world; while Daimler-Benz had long represented the German industrial might (its Mercedes cars were arguably the best example of German quality and engineering).

Germans disliked huge pay disparities and were unlikely to accept any steep revision of top management salaries. But American CEOs were rewarded handsomely: Eaton earned a total compensation of \$10.9 million in 1997. Complications would arise if an American manager posted at Stuttgart ended up reporting to a German manager who was earning half his salary. Chrysler could cut pay only at the risk of losing its talented managers. Schrempp mooted the idea of overcoming the problem through a low basic salary and high performance-based bonus, unlike anything seen in Europe. Base pay would be lower than what Germans were used to, but the pay structure would have more variable such as stock options (an American feature). German and Americans work differently. The Germans were used to lengthy reports and extended discussions. On the other hand, the Americans performed little paperwork and liked to keep their meetings short. Americans favored fast-paced trial-and-error experimentation, whereas Germans drew up detailed plans and implemented them precisely. In general, the Germans perceived the Americans as “chaotic” while the Americans felt that the Germans were stubborn “militarists.”

In 2000, there was a management exodus at Chrysler headquarters in Detroit: two successive Chrysler presidents, James Holden and Thomas Stallkamp, both American, were fired. Holden was fired after seven months in the position. Stallkamp replaced Holden and was forced to resign after 12 months as a CEO. The employees were expecting big layoffs, and were worried that the company would be sold out. In fact Chrysler was reduced to a mere operating division of DCX. The Daimler-Benz management presence permeated every important function at Chrysler USA. There was no Chrysler presence on the DCX supervisory board or the board of management. By the end of 2000, there were only 128,000 Chrysler employees still working in the US operations, all anxious and demoralized.

Daimler-Benz attempted to run Chrysler USA operations in the same way as it would run its German operations. In September 2001, Business Week wrote, *“The merger has so far fallen disastrously short of the goal. Distrust between Auburn Hills and Stuttgart has made cooperation on even the simplest of matters difficult. Coming to terms with issues like which parts Mercedes-Benz would share with Chrysler was almost impossible. The Germans and the Americans had been out of sync from the start. The two proud management teams resisted working together, were wary of change and weren’t willing to compromise. Daimler-Chrysler have combined nothing beyond some administrative departments, such as finance and public relations.”*

Questions (可以用中文或英文回答，每題 25 分):

1. Mergers and acquisitions take place to realize the synergies between the two or more companies. Why do you think the Daimler-Chrysler merger failed to realize the synergies that were expected from the merger?(25%)
2. A cross-cultural merger has failed because proper attention was not given to the difference in cultures between the two companies. What issues should be addressed to make cross-cultural merger a success?(25%)