| DC 欄位 |
值 |
語言 |
| DC.contributor | 會計研究所 | zh_TW |
| DC.creator | 黃庭瑜 | zh_TW |
| DC.creator | Ting-yu Huang | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2013-7-16T07:39:07Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2013-7-16T07:39:07Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2013 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://ir.lib.ncu.edu.tw:88/thesis/view_etd.asp?URN=100430005 | |
| dc.contributor.department | 會計研究所 | zh_TW |
| DC.description | 國立中央大學 | zh_TW |
| DC.description | National Central University | en_US |
| dc.description.abstract | 本論文係探討政府強制企業設置薪酬委員會後，對上市、上櫃公司高階經理人現金薪酬與會計績效敏感度之影響，並考慮此效果是否會受到公司未來成長機會以及盈餘狀況的影響而有所差異。本文以2011年始設立薪酬委員會之上市、上櫃公司為樣本，共1,842筆觀察資料，其中符合公司未來成長機會與公司虧損特性之樣本為1,610筆及1,548筆資料。
實證結果發現，企業設置薪酬委員會後，對高階經理人現金薪酬與會計績效之敏感度並無顯著正向之影響。然若考慮公司特性的因素，將樣本依公司未來成長機會及盈餘狀況分組，則可發現非高成長與沒有虧損之企業，於薪酬委員會設置後，確實會使高階經理人現金薪酬與會計績效之敏感度提高。公司未來成長機會的部分，結果顯示高低成長公司間，設置薪委會對高階經理人現金薪酬與會計績效敏感度之影響無顯著差異，推測原因為台灣實施員工分紅費用化所致。公司盈餘狀況的部份，結果則顯示相較於沒有虧損的企業，有虧損的企業，設立薪酬委員會之效果較不明顯。代表不完全符合政府之立法目的，設立薪酬委員會之成效會受到公司特性的影響而有所差異。 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.abstract | This research is going to discuss about the effects of establishment of compensation committee on the connections between executive cash compensation and accounting performance, and consider if the effects of firm’s growth opportunities and earnings status make some different or not . This study uses the sample of the Taiwan listed companies which established compensation committee only in 2011. There are 1842 observations, including the sample of 1610 observations which fit firm’s growth opportunities, and the sample of 1548 observations which fit loss characteristics.
The practical examination indicates that there is no evidence to show that the sensitivity of executive cash compensation to accounting performance is significantly positive when compensation committee is established. However, after considering the firm’s characteristics and divide the sample based on firm’s growth opportunities and earnings status, the results indicate that executive cash compensation is more closely aligned to accounting performance for low growth firms and profit-making firms when compensation committee is established. For the part of firm’s growth opportunities, the results show that the effect of establishment of compensation committee on the connections between executive cash compensation and accounting performance for high growth firms is no significantly different from low growth firm , and the reason is probably because of the Implement of Expensing Employee Bonuses. For firm’s earnings status, the results show that the effect of establishment of compensation committee is less positive for loss-making firms than for profit-making firms. These imply that the results are not completely consistent with the purpose of the rules because the effect of establishment of compensation committee would be affected by firm’s characteristics. | en_US |
| DC.subject | 薪酬委員會 | zh_TW |
| DC.subject | 高階經理人薪酬 | zh_TW |
| DC.subject | 薪酬績效敏感度 | zh_TW |
| DC.subject | 公司特性 | zh_TW |
| DC.subject | Compensation Committee | en_US |
| DC.subject | Executive Compensation | en_US |
| DC.subject | Pay-Performance Sensitivity | en_US |
| DC.subject | Firm’s characteristics | en_US |
| DC.title | 強制設置薪酬委員會對高階經理人薪酬與企業績效關係之影響 | zh_TW |
| dc.language.iso | zh-TW | zh-TW |
| DC.title | The Effect of Compensation Committee on the Relationship between Executive Compensation and Firm Performance | en_US |
| DC.type | 博碩士論文 | zh_TW |
| DC.type | thesis | en_US |
| DC.publisher | National Central University | en_US |