|dc.description.abstract||According to our assumption that both the telecom industry literature, symmetrical design cost manufacturers to take a non-linear pricing method and network operations inside and
outside the difference in pricing law telecommunications market model, and set the price competition among manufacturers of telecommunications operations for a two-stage game, Board game makers will be the first phase of a common agreement uniform standard access fee (but if regulatory authorities to adopt the butt renewals manufacturers compete only in the second stage), the second phase of the network were to call the call price and the external network price difference between pricing, pricing decisions based on the final consumer and then to decide between vendors consumer equilibrium.
Secondly, let us consider the extra price within the network efficiency and effectiveness of the number of Multi-cellphone, so that the number of decisions in the Multi-cellphone of consumers to relax both biochemical literature single-cellphone of Subscribe assumptions to make it more in line with practice in Taiwan. By modifying Hotelling spatial competition model the way in which to analyze the Multi-cellphone phenomenon; model we will develop new model called the Multi-cellphone model.
By Multi-cellphone phenomenon after the telecommunications market structure model analysis we draw the following three main conclusions:
First, when the door to provide cost f the lower number, the lower the total marginal cost c, the relative net utility network level r = v / τ higher and higher when the cost-plus rate m follow, action telecommunications market will be re-door No phenomenon and subsequently increase; but if Multi-cellphone does not exist, the action should shift to the telecommunications market in the literature both single-cellphone model number set for analysis.
Second, the current level of connection fees are regulated by the NCC, NCC completely abandoned if the docking control renewals let the market decide, the cost of symmetry, pricing and tariffs take nonlinear pricing difference between internal and external network vendors, under free competition will The first phase innings in a unified agreement connection fee equivalent to the standard marginal costs follow ǎπ = c0 (ie m = 0), this time in the net-net price equal to marginal cost equals the total price and c, manufacturers rely entirely on monthly fee profit; and Multi-cellphone phenomenon will never happen.
Finally, based on the viewpoint of social welfare, unless the cost of f at door number is relatively low and the network net utility level r = v (c | η) / τ under high specific market structure, NCC through regulatory access fees continue to increase above a certain level even if a complete ban on cross Netcom (m → ∞) thus facilitating Multi-cellphone phenomenon,only way to improve social welfare; otherwise, in general, just as the existing literature advocates, NCC should continue to cut costs to marginal access cost level (a = c0) leads to double door number disappears, to achieve social welfare maximization (another article to prove in this case, the authorities can also give up control of the docking renewals policy to achieve the same effect). Nevertheless, in the face of certain market structure analysis under both the welfare literature would have serious bias that is still new finding of our study.||en_US|