博碩士論文 101430013 完整後設資料紀錄

DC 欄位 語言
DC.contributor會計研究所zh_TW
DC.creator林宜萱zh_TW
DC.creatorYi-Shuan Linen_US
dc.date.accessioned2014-8-26T07:39:07Z
dc.date.available2014-8-26T07:39:07Z
dc.date.issued2014
dc.identifier.urihttp://ir.lib.ncu.edu.tw:88/thesis/view_etd.asp?URN=101430013
dc.contributor.department會計研究所zh_TW
DC.description國立中央大學zh_TW
DC.descriptionNational Central Universityen_US
dc.description.abstract美國沙賓法案於2002年後要求公開發行公司設立審計委員會,本研究旨在探討當審計委員會成員同時任職薪酬委員會時,是否能透過知識外溢的效果,提供更好的監督品質。首先測試經理人之權益薪酬與較高的經理人風險承擔是否有關係,以及薪酬與審計委員會成員之重疊對經理人風險承擔之影響。隨後探討透過薪酬與審計委員會成員之重疊是否能改善因為權益薪酬而導致之經理人風險承擔的水準。 研究結果發現經理人之權益薪酬會導致較高的經理人風險承擔,以及薪酬與審計委員會成員之重疊對於經理人風險承擔有負向的影響。本研究結果也顯示雖然審計與薪酬委員會成員重疊能隨低企業風險承擔,但是其對於權益薪酬與企業風險承擔之間的關係是既沒有正向影響也沒有負向影響的。zh_TW
dc.description.abstractThe Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002(SOX) requires that the audit committee be set by public companies. This study examines whether there’s the effect of knowledge spillover to provide a better monitoring when firms’ audit and compensation committees overlap. First, we investigate whether there’s a relationship between board overlapping and market measure of risk for a sample of industrial companies during the period of 2002-2012, and whether executive equity compensation have influence on risk-taking of firms. Then, we examined the effect of overlapping membership on audit and compensation committees in the relationship between executive equity compensation and risk-taking. As a result, the equity-based compensation hold by executives induces firm risk-taking, while director overlap is negatively associated with risk-taking. The research results also suggest that the overlapping membership on audit and compensation committees is not associated with the relationship between executive equity compensation and firm risk-taking.en_US
DC.subject風險承擔zh_TW
DC.subject董事會重疊zh_TW
DC.subject權益薪酬zh_TW
DC.subject風險趨避zh_TW
DC.subject審計與薪酬委員會重疊zh_TW
DC.subject誘因薪酬zh_TW
DC.subjectrisk-takingen_US
DC.subjectoverlapen_US
DC.subjectequity-based compensationen_US
DC.subjectrisk aversionen_US
DC.subjectaudit and compensation committees overlapen_US
DC.subjectincentive compensationen_US
DC.title審計委員會與薪酬委員會成員重疊在經理人權益薪酬與企業風險承擔關係中扮演之角色zh_TW
dc.language.isozh-TWzh-TW
DC.titleThe Role of Overlapping Membership on Audit and Compensation Committees in the Relationship between Executive Equity Compensation and Firm Risk-Takingen_US
DC.type博碩士論文zh_TW
DC.typethesisen_US
DC.publisherNational Central Universityen_US

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