博碩士論文 104430013 完整後設資料紀錄

DC 欄位 語言
DC.contributor會計研究所zh_TW
DC.creator羅慧君zh_TW
DC.creatorHui-Chun Loen_US
dc.date.accessioned2017-7-6T07:39:07Z
dc.date.available2017-7-6T07:39:07Z
dc.date.issued2017
dc.identifier.urihttp://ir.lib.ncu.edu.tw:88/thesis/view_etd.asp?URN=104430013
dc.contributor.department會計研究所zh_TW
DC.description國立中央大學zh_TW
DC.descriptionNational Central Universityen_US
dc.description.abstract本研究以Abercrombie & Fitch (簡稱A&F), GAP, NIKE, SKECHERS, Steve Madden, Under Armour,作為本研究之樣本。本研究蒐集公司自願採用經理人薪酬索回條款之年度,以及各公司經理人各年度之薪酬、營收總額。而資料年度主要涵蓋2004年至2015年間。 本研究發現公司自願採用經理人薪酬索回條款後,相較於自願採用前,經理人獲得的紅利獎金減少、紅利獎金佔總薪酬比重下降。本研究亦發現,公司在DFA 954頒布後,相較於DFA 954頒布前,不論先前有無自願採用經理人薪酬索回條款,經理人獲得的紅利獎金減少、紅利獎金佔總薪酬比重下降。zh_TW
dc.description.abstract This study was conducted by companies such as A & F, GAP, NIKE, SKECHERS, Steve Madden, and Under Armor as a sample of this study. And this study collect the company voluntarily adopted the clawback provisions of the year, as well as the company′s annual executive’s compensations, total revenue in the company′s annual report and Proxy Statement. The above data mainly covers from 2004 to 2015 . This study found that the company voluntarily adopted the clawback provisions, bonus decrease, bonus to total compensations ratio decreased. This study also found that the company after DFA 954 released, bonus decrease, bonus to total compensations ratio decreased.en_US
DC.subject經理人薪酬索回條款zh_TW
DC.subject紅利獎金zh_TW
DC.subject經理人薪酬zh_TW
DC.subject沙氏法案zh_TW
DC.subject多德-佛蘭克華爾街改革與消費者保護法zh_TW
DC.subjectClawback provisionsen_US
DC.subjectbonusen_US
DC.subjectexecutive compensationsen_US
DC.subjectSOX 304en_US
DC.subjectDFA 954en_US
DC.title薪酬索回條款對經理人獎酬之影響-以美國零售業公司為例zh_TW
dc.language.isozh-TWzh-TW
DC.titleThe effects of clawback provisions on executive’s compensations: A case study of US retail companiesen_US
DC.type博碩士論文zh_TW
DC.typethesisen_US
DC.publisherNational Central Universityen_US

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