| dc.description.abstract | This dissertation analyzes the differences between a firm’s production and pollution control decisions in a mixed oligopoly market.And how the government imposes the pollution tax. This dissertation finds that in a mixed duopoly market, the higher the pollution tax imposed by the government, the lower the production of a private firm and the increase in public firm. The marginal environmental damage must be large enough for the government to impose a pollution tax, otherwise the government will not impose a pollution tax on firms. If the marginal environmental damage increases, the pollution tax imposed by the government will be higher. When there are many private firms and one public firm in the market, it is found that if the number of private firms increases, the output of public firm will be reduced, but it does no effect on the output of private firms. Moreover, the number of private firms
does not affect the optimal pollution tax. In addition, if there is a private firm and a privatization firm in the market, it can be found that if the pollution tax is increased, the private firm will reduce output, but the output of the privatization firm depends on degree of privatization, and the optimal pollution tax will increase with the degree of
privatization. | en_US |