博碩士論文 108429006 完整後設資料紀錄

DC 欄位 語言
DC.contributor經濟學系zh_TW
DC.creator吳宣毅zh_TW
DC.creatorHsuan-Yi Wuen_US
dc.date.accessioned2021-10-26T07:39:07Z
dc.date.available2021-10-26T07:39:07Z
dc.date.issued2021
dc.identifier.urihttp://ir.lib.ncu.edu.tw:88/thesis/view_etd.asp?URN=108429006
dc.contributor.department經濟學系zh_TW
DC.description國立中央大學zh_TW
DC.descriptionNational Central Universityen_US
dc.description.abstract本文研究在不同情形下的雙邊獨占市場中,具有上下游關係的兩間廠商做出的CSR決策會如何影響均衡結果,進一步分析廠商行為對社會福利的影響。 本文發現廠商投入CSR會對產品價格及中間財價格造成不同幅度的影響,但無論廠商在CSR決策階段的行動順序為何,上游廠商皆會選擇投入更高的CSR程度。而當下游廠商具有強大議價力時,產品價格會降低,產品數量提高,生產者總剩餘及社會福利也會提高,然而社會中CSR程度總和卻有可能提高或降低。最後,若上游廠商投入CSR具有折扣效果則會使上游廠商參與社會CSR投入占比降低,且社會福利下降。zh_TW
dc.description.abstractThis article studies how the CSR decisions made by upstream and downstream firms in different situations in bilateral exclusive markets will affect the equilibrium results, and further analyze the impact of firms’ behavior on social welfare. We find that manufacturer’s investment in CSR will have varying degrees of impact on product prices and the price of intermediate goods. However, no matter what the manufacturer chooses to do in the CSR decision-making stage, upstream manufacturer will invest in a higher degree of CSR. When downstream retailer have strong bargaining power, product prices will decrease, product quantity will increase, and total producer surplus and social welfare will increase. However, the sum of CSR levels in society may increase or decrease. Finally, if the upstream manufacturer’s investment in CSR has a discount effect, the proportion of upstream retailer′s participation in social CSR investment will decrease, and social welfare will decline.en_US
DC.subject企業社會責任zh_TW
DC.subject雙邊獨占市場zh_TW
DC.subject社會福利zh_TW
DC.subjectCorporate Social Responsibilityen_US
DC.subjectBilateral Monopoly Marketen_US
DC.subjectSocial Welfareen_US
DC.title雙邊獨占與廠商企業社會責任決策zh_TW
dc.language.isozh-TWzh-TW
DC.type博碩士論文zh_TW
DC.typethesisen_US
DC.publisherNational Central Universityen_US

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