| dc.description.abstract | The rise of security threats, particularly the occurrence of fake in-browser windows updates, has highlighted the vulnerabilities present in online environments. These fake update pages mimic legitimate interfaces to deceive users into clicking on malicious content, often leading to the inadvertent installation of malware through drive-by-download attacks.
This thesis focuses on the potential risks associated with cookie banners, specifically the possibility of malicious banners being provided by cookie banner providers. If such malicious banners are deployed, the history of deceptive tactics repeats itself, placing users at significant risk.
Through a comprehensive analysis, this research examines various attack mechanisms, including the use of executable files, scripts, and macros, to exploit vulnerabilities in cookie banners. The behavior of different file types and the effectiveness of defense mechanisms, such as browsers, Windows Defender, and anti-virus software, are evaluated. The results reveal the limitations of existing security measures, as compressed files can successfully infiltrate the client-side environment, evading detection and increasing the risk to users.
Ultimately, this thesis seeks to empower website owners, developers, and users with the knowledge needed to mitigate the risks associated with malicious cookie banners and drive-by-download attacks. By adopting proactive measures and implementing appropriate security protocols, it is possible to enhance the overall security posture of online environments and protect users from potential threats. | en_US |