| DC 欄位 |
值 |
語言 |
| DC.contributor | 人力資源管理研究所 | zh_TW |
| DC.creator | 李思瑩 | zh_TW |
| DC.creator | Szu-Yin Lee | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2003-7-8T07:39:07Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2003-7-8T07:39:07Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2003 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://ir.lib.ncu.edu.tw:88/thesis/view_etd.asp?URN=90427002 | |
| dc.contributor.department | 人力資源管理研究所 | zh_TW |
| DC.description | 國立中央大學 | zh_TW |
| DC.description | National Central University | en_US |
| dc.description.abstract | 高階經理人的薪酬一直是備受矚目的焦點，以代理理論觀點來看，在代理關係的架構下，為了連結高階經理人與股東的利益，高階經理人薪酬的設計機制愈形重要。
過去國內關於高階經理人薪酬之研究，由於缺乏客觀的薪酬資料，多數以問卷調查方式蒐集薪酬相關資料；而較近期有以次級財務資料進行驗證者，亦有探討變數或者是研究期間限制上的問題。本研究最大之相異處在於，涵蓋財務評估、公司治理結構及權變因素三種構面之變數，自證基會真象王資料庫與台灣經濟薪報資料庫，取得402家88年至90年上市公司財報資料；此外，基於薪酬設計的原則在於給員工過去努力成果的報酬，以及消除公司的固定影響效果，本研究同時採用遞延模型與一階差分兩種多元迴歸模型進行實證，期望從中發現更多高階經理人薪酬設計之重要機制。而本研究以總經理為高階經理人之代表。
研究結果顯示，公司前期經營績效越好，總經理的薪酬水準會越高，而薪酬也會越高；當總資產與市場價值越高或是成長越多的時候，總經理的薪酬水準薪酬變動(增加)也越多。關於公司治理結構與權變因素，則得到較混淆的結果，這兩個構面，對於總經理的薪酬水準相較於薪酬的變動有更為顯著的影響，顯示公司治理結構對於總經理的薪酬水準訂定有較直接且決定性的監控效果；而研發支出代表高階經理人的決策能力，對其薪酬水準也有加分的作用。
整體而言，不論是台灣總經理的薪酬水準或薪酬變動，都明顯地受到財務績效指標之影響。然而，其他因素雖然對高階經理人薪酬水準有顯著的影響效果，卻無法觀察出其對於薪酬變化量的影響效果，有可能受到某些制度環境之限制。未來如果能更擴大研究期間、豐富變數的內涵及種類，不管在學術上或是實業界，對於台灣高階經理人薪酬決定因素之探究必能帶來更大的貢獻。 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.abstract | In order to align the objectives between managers and stockholders, agency theory argues that companies need to design the executive pay preciously so as to attract, retain, motivate, and reward these executive managers.
Empirical studies have concluded that size and performance of firm are the major determinants of executive total compensation. This study examines the determinants of CEO compensation from three aspects which include financial indicators, corporate governance and contingent factors. By collecting pooled data on 402 publicly Taiwan companies gathered from 1999 to 2001, I analyze two models, lagged model and change model to explore the influential factors of determinants of CEO pay in Taiwan.
Corporate size and performance are found to be the major explanatory variables to the level and change of executive pay. Nevertheless, the impacts of ownership structure and boards composition on CEO pay are more mixed. The ownership of large stockholders has negative effect and duality of CEO has positive effect on executive pay significantly. In addition, the expense of R&D which represents the executive decision-making ability has positive effect on the level of executive pay.
Overall, firms’ financial performance is the most significant determinant of CEO pay in Taiwanese firms. Although some of the variables of corporate governance have significant effects on the level of CEO pay, all of them have little association with change in executive pay. | en_US |
| DC.subject | 高階經理人 | zh_TW |
| DC.subject | 薪酬設計 | zh_TW |
| DC.subject | 代理理論 | zh_TW |
| DC.subject | 公司治理 | zh_TW |
| DC.subject | executive pay | en_US |
| DC.subject | corporate governance | en_US |
| DC.subject | CEO | en_US |
| DC.subject | agency theory | en_US |
| DC.title | 高階經理人薪酬決定因素之實證研究 | zh_TW |
| dc.language.iso | zh-TW | zh-TW |
| DC.title | The determinants of CEO compensation - An Empirical Examination on Taiwanese Firms | en_US |
| DC.type | 博碩士論文 | zh_TW |
| DC.type | thesis | en_US |
| DC.publisher | National Central University | en_US |