博碩士論文 93446002 完整後設資料紀錄

DC 欄位 語言
DC.contributor工業管理研究所zh_TW
DC.creator曹譽鐘zh_TW
DC.creatorYu-Chung Tsaoen_US
dc.date.accessioned2008-1-8T07:39:07Z
dc.date.available2008-1-8T07:39:07Z
dc.date.issued2008
dc.identifier.urihttp://ir.lib.ncu.edu.tw:88/thesis/view_etd.asp?URN=93446002
dc.contributor.department工業管理研究所zh_TW
DC.description國立中央大學zh_TW
DC.descriptionNational Central Universityen_US
dc.description.abstract供應商提供激勵機制給零售商以促進銷售在現今的企業中已相當普遍。信用交易、現金折扣、數量折扣、成本分攤等皆是實務上常見的降低付款機制。因此在建構供應鏈系統模型時必須同時考量到激勵策略的影響。此外,通路成員間的合作對提升通路競爭力極為重要。這意味著在同一供應鏈下的各公司必須協調其利益以使大家都朝著相同的方向努力。有鑒於此,本研究發展了幾個在激勵策略下針對各種不同環境的協同供應鏈決策之最佳化模型。其目的在於放寬一些傳統研究的假設以俾使模型更趨於實務。 本篇論文首先考慮一在信用交易與運輸成本具數量折扣下的供應商-零售商通路。接著延伸此模型考慮在一多品項供應鏈中當運輸價格折扣與運輸重量成正相關時的狀況。當考慮零售商的促銷策略時,我們透過數學模型分析並比較兩種被設計為協調通路成員行為的促銷補貼機制:促銷成本分攤與現金折扣。並且,我們也處理了在需求與價格及時間相依下退化性商品的動態定價、促銷與訂購決策。另外多零售商通路的配銷模式也已經在許多企業中可見,像是電子、器材、服飾業等。因此我們發展一個在各通路需求會因零售價而產生替代效益的多零售商通路供應鏈模型。我們也另外考慮一個具銷售學習曲線的雙重通路,而此供應鏈之零售商間的競爭是因缺貨時產生的替代效應而形成。 針對各個模型,我們不僅提供有關最佳化條件的定理,並發展於實務上易於執行演算法以尋求各模型最佳解。透過數值分析,我們探討系統參數對通路決策與行為的影響。完整的數值分析將被用以驗證模型結果之正確性與實際現象之吻合度並提出一些結論。此研究成果將提供給管理者於決策與經營上之有利參考與依據。zh_TW
dc.description.abstractThe practice of suppliers providing incentives to retailers to promote the sales is popular in today’s business. Trade credit, cash discount, quantity discount, cost sharing, etc., are the quite prevalent payment reduction schemes in reality. As a result, the influences of incentive policies cannot be ignored on modeling supply chain system. Also, coordination among channel member is important for enhancing a channel’s competitiveness. This indicates that companies in the same channel shall align their incentives to pull in the same direction. This research develops several models to consider coordinating supply chain decisions under incentive policies for different circumstances. The purpose is to relax several assumptions to cope with more practical situations. In this dissertation we firstly consider supplier-retailer channels subject to trade credit and quantity discounts for freight cost. Then we extend the model to consider the situation when price freight–transport discounts that are positively related to the weight of cargo transported in a multi-item supply chain. When considering retailer promotion policy, we present a model to analyze and compare two cooperative promotion allowances, promotional effort cost sharing and cash discount, which are designed for coordinating channel partner’s behavior in the third model. Also, we deal with the dynamic pricing, promotion and replenishment policies for a deteriorating item with price and time dependent demand. In addition, the multi-retailers channel of distribution has occurred in many industries, such as electronics, appliances and apparel etc. We develop a dual-channel supply chain that the end demand for each channel has substitute effect in terms of retail prices. We also consider a multi-retailers channel with sales learning curve when the retailer competition arises from substitution effect due to shortages. For each model, we not only provide propositions for the conditions of optimality but also develop algorithms to search optimal solutions, which can be easily implemented in practice. Through the numerical analyses, we discuss the influences of system parameters on decisions and behaviors of the channel. We conclude with computation analyses that lead to a variety of management insights. These results should be a useful reference for managerial decisions and administrations.en_US
DC.subject信用交易zh_TW
DC.subject定價zh_TW
DC.subject促銷zh_TW
DC.subject訂購zh_TW
DC.subject運輸成本折扣zh_TW
DC.subject通路合作zh_TW
DC.subject現金折扣zh_TW
DC.subject退化性商品zh_TW
DC.subject雙重通路zh_TW
DC.subject銷售學習曲線zh_TW
DC.subjectPromotionen_US
DC.subjectReplenishmenten_US
DC.subjectTrade crediten_US
DC.subjectPricingen_US
DC.title激勵策略下協同供應鏈決策之最佳化模式zh_TW
dc.language.isozh-TWzh-TW
DC.titleOptimization Models for Coordinating Supply Chain Decisions under Incentive Policiesen_US
DC.type博碩士論文zh_TW
DC.typethesisen_US
DC.publisherNational Central Universityen_US

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