| dc.description.abstract | This dissertation concludes three parts analyzes goods with asymmetric Cournot duopoly. First, it’s demonstrated for two differentiated goods that if one of the perfectly competitive equilibrium and monopoly solution is interior, then Cournot equilibrium is interior; and the converse is not true. Consider two cases. One is that both Cournot equilibrium and monopoly solution are interior and if the asymmetry between goods is weak enough, then everything is normal. Otherwise, the more efficient good’’s Cournot output is lower than its monopoly output, and industry output may be lower in Cournot equilibrium than in monopoly solution. Nonetheless, the welfare ranking is normal. The other is that Cournot equilibrium is interior, whereas monopoly solution is corner. The abnormal rankings regarding outputs are able to reverse the welfare ranking: Cournot equilibrium yields lower welfare than monopoly
solution if and only if the asymmetry between is strong enough. We establish that each Cournot price falls below its corresponding monopoly price regardless of whether monopoly solution is interior or not. Unfortunately, it is known that lower prices are not necessarily better in welfare terms.
Second, it is demonstrated in two complementary goods if a good is active in Cournot equilibrium, then it is active in monopoly solution; but, the converse is not true. We
establish that if and only if a good is supplemental, then, in monopoly solution, it should be cross-subsidized. When there exists a supplemental good, lower quantities
are not necessarily worse in welfare terms, and hence Cournot equilibrium is not necessarily less welfare-efficient than monopoly solution. The other is that if each
good is a base good, then Cournot equilibrium indeed is less welfare-efficient than monopoly solution. We demonstrate that prices are lower in monopoly solution, and
that lower prices are better in the welfare terms. These two results imply that welfare is higher in monopoly solution, no matter the solutions are interior or not.
Finally, we apply in licensing by means of a two-part tariff in a Cournot duopoly where one of the firms is the patentee of a cost-reducing technology created by an
innovation. We compare the two-part tariff licensing by three alternative means for the transfer of technological knowledge: the fixed-fee licensing, the royalty licensing
and the merger. We demonstrate that the results are sensitive to the degree of demand asymmetry.
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