| dc.description.abstract | We use the economics analytical method to discuss how the government’s educational policies affect the universities performance. We first discuss the government’s optimal tuition fee and optimal educational subsidies. And then, we also discuss how these two educational policies change when the university’s or the government’s emphasis on students’ performance changes. Secondly, we explore how student enrollment numbers and graduation standards can be employed to maximize university’s overall performance. We also explore the impact of lowering student tuitions differential upon this overall performance. Thirdly, we establish a theoretical model to analyze the optimal resources distribution of the university when the university must put its resources in teaching, research, and students’ characteristic education. In this issue, we also explore what is the government’s optimal characteristic educational subsidy policy.
About the first topic, we assume a government simultaneously cares about students’ performance and university’s managerial objectives, while university’s objective includes student performance and its profit. In the two-stage game structure, we find that the university’s optimal number of classes increases with the government’s subsidies, and decreases with tuition fees. We also find that when the government puts more emphasis on students’ performance, it should increase subsidies and reduce tuition fees. When the university cares more about the student performance, the government should reduce tuition fees as well as subsidies.
About the second topic, we find that regardless of the degree a university stresses research, the university with higher tuition fee establishes higher graduation standards. Fixed governmental subsidy do not affect the establishment of university graduation standards, and the enroll standard of intellectual endowment. Secondly, when governmental subsidies are equivalent between two universities, and the universities that stress research more, the university which charge lower tuition that tend to have superior overall performance. However, when universities do not stress research, the university which charge higher tuition tends to have a superior overall performance. Lastly, a lower differential on tuition between universities also reduces the overall performance differential of the universities; nevertheless the tendency remains that universities which formerly enjoyed good overall performance tend to perform more poorly.
As to the university’s characteristic education, we find that the university must put more resources for the students’ characteristic education and put fewer resources for teaching when the students’ initial character is worse. The change of resources for university’s research will be booked on the basis that whether the student’s character influences teaching when the students’ character is worse. Secondly when the government’s characteristic subsidies increases, the university will put more resources for characteristic education and teaching, but the real expenditure of characteristic education is reduced. Lastly, we find the government’s optimal characteristic subsidies equal to the marginal damages that student’’s character causes to the society.
| en_US |