| DC 欄位 |
值 |
語言 |
| DC.contributor | 經濟學系 | zh_TW |
| DC.creator | 陳聖方 | zh_TW |
| DC.creator | Sheng-Fang Chen | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2008-7-16T07:39:07Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2008-7-16T07:39:07Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2008 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://ir.lib.ncu.edu.tw:88/thesis/view_etd.asp?URN=954209008 | |
| dc.contributor.department | 經濟學系 | zh_TW |
| DC.description | 國立中央大學 | zh_TW |
| DC.description | National Central University | en_US |
| dc.description.abstract | 本文建立一個雙邊市場模型來分析平台對廠商收取之價格以及平台對消費者提供之服務。在模型假設中，存在兩個參與平台的群體：消費者以及廠商。平台可以藉由提供服務給消費者以吸引消費者參與並且向廠商收取平台參與費用。本文針對獨占平台以及雙占平台做比較，在文中我們發現獨占平台中對廠商所收取的費用有可能會低於雙占平台。相較以往文獻不同之處在於，本文以平台提供服務取代對消費者收費，並且使用相同的設定處理一系列平台競爭的問題並對其結果作比較。 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.abstract | We construct a two-sided model to analyze the price that platforms charge for firms and the service that platforms provide to consumers. In the model there are two groups joining platform: firms and consumers where each group cares about the numbers of the other group. Platforms can attract consumers by providing service and charge for firms. We consider monopoly and duopoly platform competition and in this article. It can be shown that the price charged for firms in monopoly may lower than in duopoly. Besides, the firms and consumers’ reservation price will make different results in monopoly platform. Compare with early literatures, this article considers service provided to consumers but not charge for consumers. Besides, we use the consistent assumption to deal with a series issue of two-sided platforms competition and make comparison. | en_US |
| DC.subject | 網路外部性 | zh_TW |
| DC.subject | 雙邊市場 | zh_TW |
| DC.subject | two-sided platfom | en_US |
| DC.subject | network externality | en_US |
| DC.title | 雙邊市場下之平台定價策略之研究 | zh_TW |
| dc.language.iso | zh-TW | zh-TW |
| DC.title | Network Pricing in Two-Sided Platforms | en_US |
| DC.type | 博碩士論文 | zh_TW |
| DC.type | thesis | en_US |
| DC.publisher | National Central University | en_US |