| dc.description.abstract | This article discusses the brand owner in the commodity market to monopolize the market, facing two separation’’s regions by the straight store, the franchising store, or simultaneously uses these two kind of strategy discussion brand owner to pursue under the gross profit maximization, should choose what way management, And is authorized the investor in two region distinction technology to open two tfranchising the store, when forms in the brand the price competition, using undercut-proof the equilibrium theory and analyzes in the brand by the game consists of two stage match bureau when the price competition the most suitable business model and the biggest profit.
The game procedure as follows shows: The first stage: At the same time two franchising brand store establishe the price independently,. The second stage: The consumer is purchasing selection of observing price . And using undercut-proof the equilibrium theory, discusses in this balanced two brand franchising store can maximization the profit, simultaneously does not have the cause to adopt cuting prices to the strategy of the competing price.
The findings are as follows:
1.To monopoly Chain store brand owner, the choice only establishes a franchising store, then the straight store .
2. The brand monopolized manufacturer under the consumer symmetrical distributed situation, open two franchising store in two region distinction, schedules the price to pay transportation cost two times for the consumer
3. under the different modes of business operation, The modes of business operation are superior that the brand monopolized manufacturer to establish two franchising store separately in two regions.
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