| dc.description.abstract | The thesis of the article constituted of three different issues, of which the first two issues introduce a new concept, known as a two-sided market, into the pricing behavior of amusement parks and the welfare of health care market, respectively. Our main findings are as follows: in the first issue, a monopolistic amusement park will increase (decrease) the admission fee if the consumers have a larger (smaller) cross-side network externality and will enable the park to enjoy higher revenues when compared to amusement parks without externality, but in the case of duopolistic amusement parks, no matter which agent has a larger cross-side network externality, amusement parks will always decrease admission fees and receive lower revenues because of the increased competition in a two-sided market when compared to amusement parks without any externality. In the second issue, when the public hospital and private hospital have the same cost structure, the social welfare under mixed duopoly may higher than under state-run and profit-maximizing duopoly.
As for the last issue, we explore the optimal degree of privatization for a public firm which does not need to care about its rival’s profit completely. We find that: when the regulated price is exogenously determined, the optimal degree of privatization depends on the amount of regulated price; that is, if the exogenously regulated price is small (medium, large), then partial privatization (complete privatization, fully nationalization) is the optimal strategy for the government. In the case of the regulated price is endogenously determined, the optimal strategy is full privatization. | en_US |