博碩士論文 100427025 詳細資訊




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姓名 邱薇庭( Wei-ting Chiu)  查詢紙本館藏   畢業系所 人力資源管理研究所
論文名稱 公司治理結構與就業調整
(Corporate Governance Structure and Employment Adjustment)
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摘要(中) 在2008年所發生的金融海嘯對全世界都造成了很大的影響,而台灣也不例外。遭逢金融海嘯的衝擊,各家企業紛紛開始思考該如何降低營運及生產成本以度過此金融危機,裁員往往是企業最常採取的手段,然而當大部分的企業採取裁員的手段來度過金融危機時,仍有一些標竿企業選擇了其它的做法,做了不同的決策。在企業中做此人事調動的決策者往往是公司的高層,也就是董事會成員,因此本研究目的即是要探討不同的公司治理結構是否會對就業調整有影響而有不一樣的調整速度,並透過此研究來了解在企業在面臨虧損的時候,是否會因為公司治理結構的不同而採取不一樣的調整速度決策。
本研究資料來源為台灣的上市公司,共計有523家企業,並將它分類成電子產業及非電子產業。電子產業有248家而非電子產業則有275家。本研究並將公司治理結構分為四大部分做探討,分別為董事會組成、CEO雙元性、最終控制權及股權結構。研究結果發現大部分的公司治理結構對就業調整速度是有影響的,而公司治理結構和就業調整之間的關係也會受到企業虧損的影響。研究結果也發現在企業虧損的時候,就業調整速度會較快。
摘要(英) The financial tsunami in 2008 caused a great impact to the world. Many countries got affected by this financial crisis. Under this inevitable trend, Taiwan was no exception. The impact of this tsunami and also tight finances brought all of the enterprises to think about how to reduce their cost in order to get through this crisis. Layoff is usually the most common approach undergone by them. However, while most of the companies took the approach of layoffs to reduce costs, there were still some benchmark companies did not take the downsizing plan to face the economic downturn. People who are responsible for doing these reshuffling decisions are usually the senior board members in the company. So the purpose of this study is to investigate whether the corporate governance structure will affect the company's employment adjustment speed and also try to understand whether the different structure of the board of directors lead to different layoff decisions during the period of loss.
In our research, we examined 523 firms which can be separated into electronic industries and non electronic industries in Taiwan. We have 248 firms in electronic industries and 275 non electronic industries. The board structure will also be divided into four parts, which are board composition, CEO duality, ultimate ownership and ownership structure. A major finding is that most of the corporate governance structure variables have impact to the adjustment speed. The moderator of firm deficits also has effect among corporate governance structure and the employment adjustment speed. Besides, when the firm in deficits the employment adjustment speed will be faster.
關鍵字(中) ★ 公司治理
★ 就業調整
★ 董事會組成
★ CEO雙元性
★ 最終控制權
★ 股權結構
關鍵字(英) ★ corporate governance
★ employment adjustment
★ board composition
★ CEO duality
★ ultimate ownership
★ ownership structure
論文目次 CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 1
CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW 4
2.1 Employment Adjustment 4
2.2 Board Structure and Employment Adjustment 5
2.2.1 Board Composition and Employment Adjustment 5
2.2.2 CEO Duality and Employment Adjustment 6
2.2.3 Ultimate Ownership and Employment Adjustment 8
2.2.4 Ownership Structure and Employment Adjustment 9
2.2.5 Firm Deficits and Employment Adjustment 10
CHAPTER 3 METHODOLOGY 12
3.1 The Theoretical Framework 12
3.2 The Empirical Model 13
3.3 The Data 17
3.4 Data Analysis 17
CHAPTER 4 RESULTS 18
4.1 Descriptive Statistic 18
4.2 Hypothesis Testing 18
4.2.1 The Labor-Demand Function 18
4.2.2 The Speed of Employment Adjustment 19
4.2.3 The Effect of Corporate Governance Structure 21
4.3 Discussion 28
CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSION 30
5.1 Conclusion 30
5.2 Limitation and Directions for Future Research 31
REFERENCES 33
APPENDIX: The Determination of Optimal Level of Employment 37
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指導教授 陳明園(Ming-yuan Chen) 審核日期 2014-1-20
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