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姓名 鐘愛(Ai Jhong)  查詢紙本館藏   畢業系所 企業管理學系
論文名稱 中國大陸股權結構與自願性財務預測之關聯性
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摘要(中) 本研究主要探討中國大陸國有企業與自願性財務預測的關聯性。本研究樣本為中國大陸上市公司於2007年至2010年間的發布之盈餘預測樣本數。本論文分別研究中國大陸國有企業與非國有企業對自願性財務預測於揭露的意願、頻率、型態、誤差性與樂觀偏誤上是否存在顯著差異。
實證結果發現:相較於非國有企業,中國大陸的國有企業較不願意揭露自願性財務預測,且如果揭露時,其頻率也較非國有企業低。可能原因為揭露自願性財務預測的目的是為了降低投資者與公司間的資訊不對稱、公司的資金成本與管理者及股東間的代理成本。而國有企業在控制股東為政府的情況下,較沒有藉由盈餘揭露來達到現金增資的動機。再者,相較於非國有企業,國有企業較不會揭露點估計形式的盈餘預測,且其財務預測的誤差性較大,且較樂觀。可能原因為國有企業內「一股獨大」所產生的大股東與小股東間代理問題,導致大股東為了達到國家目標與個人利益,進而操弄財務資訊,犧牲公司績效。故實證結果皆與本研究之推論相符合。
摘要(英) The main purpose of this study is to examine the relationship between Chinese listed companies’ ownership structure and the voluntary earnings forecasts. Our samples contain Chinese listed companies’ earnings forecasts for the year 2007 to 2010 from China Securities Markets and Accounting Research Database (CSMAR). There are five hypotheses in our study, and they are respectively the possibility, frequency, precision, error and bias of voluntary earnings forecasts within Chinese State Ownership Companies (SOE).
According to our empirical results, the possibility and frequency of voluntary earnings forecasts are both significantly lower for SOEs than NON-SOEs. The reasons may result from the purposes for companies to disclose their earnings forecasts. SOEs have fewer incentives to disclose their earnings forecasts to mitigate the asymmetry information and the capital costs than NON-SOEs. For the precision, error and bias of the voluntary earnings forecasts, we find support for the above hypotheses. It reveals that, comparing with NON-SOEs, SOEs disclose less precise, more erroneous and more optimistically biased as we expected.
關鍵字(中) ★ 中國大陸
★ 國有企業
★ 自願性財務預測
關鍵字(英) ★ SOE
★ china
★ voluntary financial disclosure
論文目次 頁次
謝辭……………………………………………………………………………… i
中文摘要………………………………………………………………………… ii
ABSTRACT……………………………………………………………………… iii
目錄……………………………………………………………………………… iv
表目錄…………………………………………………………………………… vi
第一章 緒論
1.1 研究背景與動機…………………………………………………… 1
1.2 研究目的…………………………………………………………… 2
第二章 文獻回顧
2.1 中國大陸國有企業背景與相關研究……………………………… 4
2.2 中國大陸財務預測制度規範相關研究…………………………… 6
第三章 假說發展
3.1 國有企業與自願性財務預測發佈的意願………………………… 9
3.2 國有企業與自願性財務預測發佈的型態………………………… 10
3.3 國有企業對自願性財務預測發佈的品質………………………… 11
第四章 研究設計
4.1 變數衡量…………………………………………………………… 13
4.2 實證模型…………………………………………………………… 16
4.3 選樣………………………………………………………………… 17
第五章 實證結果分析
5.1 國有企業對自願性財務預測發佈意願的影響…………………… 19
5.2 國有企業對自願性財務預測的型態的影響……………………… 24
5.3 國有企業對自願性財務預測的品質的影響……………………… 28
第六章 結論………………………………………………………………… 33
參考文獻………………………………………………………………………… 34
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指導教授 曹壽民、沈建文 審核日期 2013-7-2
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