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姓名 楊珺涵(Chun-Han Yang)  查詢紙本館藏   畢業系所 人力資源管理研究所
論文名稱 董事會異質性之決定因素
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摘要(中) 董事會異質性為探討公司績效重要議題,而探討董事會異質uzk性之決定因素文獻並很少,且本研究認為董事會異質性會帶給董事會不同的觀點和多樣的人才。
本研究藉由以2010年底資產總額達一百五十億台幣以上的台灣上市公司作為研究對象,根據台灣各企業公開年報,提出了六項董事會異質性衡量指標:性別、任期、持股比例、教育背景(包含學歷地區、教育程度、專業領域),藉由階層迴歸分析探討四大構面(企業運作複雜度、管理階層權勢、董事會規模與結構、最終控制者權勢)對董事會異質性六大指標的關聯性。本研究利用迴歸分析針對提出的四項假說進行驗證,分別為以下:
一、企業運作複雜度與董事會異質性成正向之關係
二、管理階層權勢與董事會異質性成負向之關係
三、董事會規模與結構與董事會異質性成正向之關係
四、最終控制者權勢與董事會異質性成負向之關係
而研究結果顯示,假說一、假說二、假說三是獲得驗證的,而在假說四則部分獲得驗證,本研究認為與企業結盟合併有關係。
摘要(英) Board Heterogeneity is always an important issue when we used to examine company’s performance. However , sholar rarely studied the determinants of the board heterogeneity . Besides , we think that the more board heterogeneity the company have, the more different views and talent will be given in the board. We gathered all the Taiwan companies with toal assets above $15 billion NTD in 2012 to be our sources. There are six dependant variables: sex, tenure, sharholding ratio, educational region, educational level, Profesional background. And Four dimensions which are the complexity of company, the power of the manager, the scale and structure of the board, and the power of ultimate control. We use hierarchical regression to discuss and also verify our four hypothesis as follows:
Hypothesis 1: Board heterogeniety and the complexity of company are positive correlated
Hypothesis 2: Board heterogeniety and the power of manager are negative correlated
Hypothesis 3: Board heterogeniety and the scale and structure of the board are positive correlated
Hypothesis 4: Board heterogeniety and the power of ultimate control are negative correlated
According to our research outcome, we found the hypothesis 1,2.3 are verified, but hypothesis 4 is partially verified because of company’s alliance and merger.
關鍵字(中) ★ 董事會異質性
★ 管理階層權勢
★ 最終控制
★ 董事會
關鍵字(英) ★ Board Heterogeniety
★ Power of manager
★ Ultimate control
★ Board
論文目次 目錄
第一章緒論.............................1
第一節研究背景.......................1
第二節研究動機與目的...................2
第三節研究流程.........................3
第二章文獻回顧與假說.......................5
第一節董事會異質性......................5
第二節董事會異質性的決定因素...............7
第三章 研究方法 ...........................12
第一節研究對象.............................12
第二節研究架構與假設.......................12
第三節研究變項定義....................14
第四節階層迴歸式...............................21
第四章研究結果與討論.........................23
第一節描述性統計............................23
第二節迴歸結果.........................25
第三節研究討論..........................38
第五章研究結論與限制.....................40
第一節研究結論...............................40
第二節研究限制與建議.......................42
參考文獻...........................................43
參考文獻 參考文獻
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指導教授 陳明園 審核日期 2013-6-25
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