強制設置薪酬委員會對高階經理人薪酬與企業績效關係之影響

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黃庭瑜(Ting-yu Huang) 查詢紙本館藏

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會計研究所

論文名稱

強制設置薪酬委員會對高階經理人薪酬與企業績效關係之影響
(The Effect of Compensation Committee on the Relationship between Executive Compensation and Firm Performance)

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摘要(中)

本論文係探討政府強制企業設置薪酬委員會後，對上市、上櫃公司高階經理人現金薪酬與會計績效敏感度之影響，並考慮此效果是否會受到公司未來成長機會以及盈餘狀況的影響而有所差異。本文以2011年始設立薪酬委員會之上市、上櫃公司為樣本，共1,842筆觀察資料，其中符合公司未來成長機會與公司虧損特性之樣本為1,610筆及1,548筆資料。
　　實證結果發現，企業設置薪酬委員會後，對高階經理人現金薪酬與會計績效之敏感度並無顯著正向之影響。然若考慮公司特性的因素，將樣本依公司未來成長機會及盈餘狀況分組，則可發現非高成長與沒有虧損之企業，於薪酬委員會設置後，確實會使高階經理人現金薪酬與會計績效之敏感度提高。公司未來成長機會的部分，結果顯示高低成長公司間，設置薪委會對高階經理人現金薪酬與會計績效敏感度之影響無顯著差異，推測原因為台灣實施員工分紅費用化所致。公司盈餘狀況的部份，結果則顯示相較於沒有虧損的企業，有虧損的企業，設立薪酬委員會之效果較不明顯。代表不完全符合政府之立法目的，設立薪酬委員會之成效會受到公司特性的影響而有所差異。

摘要(英)

This research is going to discuss about the effects of establishment of compensation committee on the connections between executive cash compensation and accounting performance, and consider if the effects of firm’s growth opportunities and earnings status make some different or not . This study uses the sample of the Taiwan listed companies which established compensation committee only in 2011. There are 1842 observations, including the sample of 1610 observations which fit firm’s growth opportunities, and the sample of 1548 observations which fit loss characteristics.
　　The practical examination indicates that there is no evidence to show that the sensitivity of executive cash compensation to accounting performance is significantly positive when compensation committee is established. However, after considering the firm’s characteristics and divide the sample based on firm’s growth opportunities and earnings status, the results indicate that executive cash compensation is more closely aligned to accounting performance for low growth firms and profit-making firms when compensation committee is established. For the part of firm’s growth opportunities, the results show that the effect of establishment of compensation committee on the connections between executive cash compensation and accounting performance for high growth firms is no significantly different from low growth firm , and the reason is probably because of the Implement of Expensing Employee Bonuses. For firm’s earnings status, the results show that the effect of establishment of compensation committee is less positive for loss-making firms than for profit-making firms. These imply that the results are not completely consistent with the purpose of the rules because the effect of establishment of compensation committee would be affected by firm’s characteristics.

關鍵字(中)

★ 薪酬委員會
★ 高階經理人薪酬
★ 薪酬績效敏感度
★ 公司特性

關鍵字(英)

★ Compensation Committee
★ Executive Compensation
★ Pay-Performance Sensitivity
★ Firm’s characteristics

論文目次

中文摘要　i
ABSTRACT　ii
誌謝　iii
目錄　iv
圖目錄　vi
表目錄　vii
一、緒論　1
1-1　　研究背景與動機　1
1-2　　研究目的　3
1-3　　研究架構與研究流程圖　4
二、文獻回顧與探討　6
2-1　　薪酬委員會　6
2-2　　薪酬與績效之相關性　11
2-3　　薪酬委員會與薪酬績效敏感度之關係　13
2-4　　公司特性對薪酬績效敏感度的影響　14
三、研究假說與研究方法　16
3-1　　研究假說　16
3-2　　樣本選取與資料來源　18
3-3　　研究方法　20
3-3-1　變數定義　20
3-3-2　模型設計　26
四、實證結果與分析　28
4-1　　敘述性統計　28
4-2　　相關性分析 32
4-3　　研究結果　35
4-3-1　假說一　35
4-3-2　假說二　35
4-3-3　假說三　36
4-4　　穩健性測試　40
4-4-1　淨值報酬率(ROE)替換為資產報酬率(ROA)　40
4-4-2　樣本分組　45
4-5　　研究結果之彙總　51
五、研究結論與建議　52
5-1　　研究結論　52
5-2　　研究限制與建議　53
參考文獻　54

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指導教授

盧佳琪

審核日期

2013-7-16

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