||This article suggests that managerial compensation may be an important reason to affect insurance policy. we assume two conditions, one is probability of insolvency, the other is incentive contract. First scenario, under fixed compensation without insolvency risk, leverage is irrelevant to insurance, insurance coverage sufficient to eliminate insolvency is optimal; Second scenario, under fixed compensation with insolvency risk, if currently debt lower the optimal leverage then leverage is substitute for insurance, and vice versa；Third scenario, under incentive compensation without insolvency risk, leverage is complement for insurance, besides, manager adjust debt ratio by its own interests, incentive contract is negative correlation; Forth scenario, under incentive compensation with insolvency risk, insurance coverage sufficient to eliminate insolvency is optimal for the same reason as second scenario.|
 郭憲章等，「CEO 之激勵調和、風險趨避、及財務效果」，NSC98-2410-H-147-011-MY2。
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