高階經理人債權薪酬與公司債利差之探討

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姓名

張柏堅(Po-kin Cheung) 查詢紙本館藏

畢業系所

財務金融學系

論文名稱

高階經理人債權薪酬與公司債利差之探討
(CEO inside debt and corporate bond yield spreads)

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摘要(中)

本篇論論文以北北美市場 2006 年年至 2011 年年之樣本,探討 CEO 債權性質薪酬之持有對公司債利利差之影響;一般認為在給予 CEO 債權性質薪酬會使其利利害關係趨同於債權人,使 CEO 態度度趨於保守降降低公司風險,因此在 CEO 有較多的債權性質薪酬持有會使其公司債之殖利利率率率下降降,進一步影響公司債的利利差;在本篇論論文的實證研究中所做出的結果,與過去文獻所得出的結果符合,具有債權性質之薪酬對於公司債利利差會造成負向影響的;在分開不不同公司債評等之樣本時,債權性質的薪酬對於信用評等較好的公司債利利差是較沒有效果的;最後再探討這些債權性質薪酬的持有在金金融海嘯的前後是否有造成不不同的影響,結果是在金金融海嘯以後這些債權性質薪酬的持有對公司債利利差更更具有影響。

摘要(英)

In this paper, we examined the relation between the holding of the CEO debt- like compensation and bond yield spreads using a sample of the U.S from 2006 to 2011. It is widely recognized that the more debt-like compensation for CEO, the more conservative he is. The interest of the CEO is similar to creditors. Therefore, Creditors are willing to give him a lower yield. The result of this paper mostly consists with the previous assumptions that debt-like compensations have negative effect on bond yield spreads. We also found out debt-like compensations have no effects on safer bond. Finally, we examined the samples of pre-financial tsunami and post-financial tsunami. We found out this effect is significantly stronger after the financial tsunami.

關鍵字(中)

★ 公司債
★ 經理人薪酬
★ 債權薪債

關鍵字(英)

★ corporate bond
★ CEO compensations
★ inside debt

論文目次

一、緒論
1.1背景介紹..................................................1
1.2研究動機..................................................2
1.3研究架構..................................................3
二、文獻回顧
2.1代理問題與經理人薪酬之背景.....................4
2.2債權薪酬之興起........................................4
2.3債權薪酬與資金成本..................................5
2.4公司債利差...............................................7
三、研究方法
3.1模型設定..................................................9
3.2樣本介紹.................................................10
3.3主要解釋變數說明與假設...........................10
四、實證研究
4.1敍述統計量..............................................13
4.2相關係數矩陣...........................................14
4.3實證迴歸分析...........................................14
4.3.1全部樣本迴歸結果................................15
4.3.2穩健性測試與內生性問題之檢定.............16
4.3.3以評等分別之迴歸結果.........................16
4.3.4觀察金融海嘯前後之迴歸結果................17
五、結論......................................................19
參考文獻......................................................21
附表.............................................................24

參考文獻

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21
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Lu, C.-W., T.-K. Chen and H.-H. Liao (2010). "Information uncertainty, information asymmetry and corporate bond yield spreads." Journal of Banking & Finance 34(9): 2265-2279.
Sundaram, R. K. and D. L. Yermack (2007). "Pay me later: Inside debt and its role in managerial compensation." The Journal of Finance 62(4): 1551-1588.
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Yu, F. (2005). "Accounting transparency and the term structure of credit spreads." Journal of Financial Economics 75(1): 53-84.

指導教授

黃泓人(Hong-ren Huang)

審核日期

2014-7-30

推文