投資人情緒對高階經理人誘因型薪酬制定之影響

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張簡乃綺(Nai-Chi Chang Chien) 查詢紙本館藏

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財務金融學系

論文名稱

投資人情緒對高階經理人誘因型薪酬制定之影響
(Investor Sentiment and Executive Compensation)

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摘要(中)

本文旨在分析投資人情緒對企業在制定高階經理人誘因型薪酬上所造成之影響，由代理理論出發，探討公司在制定誘因型薪酬契約的同時，是否會因應當下市場投資人情緒的起伏來調整政策，達到有效運用誘因型薪酬之目的，以維持其公司治理的效率性，本研究以台灣證券交易所上市上櫃公司高階經理人之薪酬契約為研究對象，並以世新大學投資人情緒指數作為主要解釋變數，控制變數則包含公司績效、規模、負債比率、研發費用率及公司成立年數，研究期間為2005年至2012年共八年。
就1344家上市上櫃公司共計9202筆經理人薪酬資料進行橫斷面迴歸分析後，本文發現以下結果，首先，在台灣股市中，股價在投資人情緒高漲時會出現高估的情形，第二，在投資人情緒高漲時，經理人薪酬與會計績效之敏感度會增加，同時與市場績效之敏感度會減少，表示公司在選擇薪酬衡量指標時確實會考慮投資人情緒所帶來的影響，指出台灣企業能夠因應市場情緒有效管理其薪酬契約，以維持公司治理效率。

摘要(英)

In this essay we investigate whether companies take into account market sentiment when designing compensation contracts for their top managers. Since the value of equity compensation depends on the market price of shares, in order to make their compensation policy efficient, firms may have to makes adjustments when investor sentiment is high and the share price is deviant from its fundamental value. With a sample of 9,202 managers in 1,344 Taiwanese companies, we document two important findings. First, stocks indeed are more likely to be over-valued when investor sentiment is high. Second, companies in Taiwan do actively manage their compensation policies. We find that CEO pay is correlated with operating performance to a greater extent and correlated with stock performance to a lesser extent when sentiment is high, indicating firms take into account sentiment when choosing the CEO performance measures. Our evidence is in support of the view that Taiwanese companies efficiently manage their executive compensation policies and pursue maximal shareholder value.

關鍵字(中)

★ 代理理論
★ 投資人情緒
★ 經理人薪酬
★ 誘因型薪酬

關鍵字(英)

★ Agency theory
★ Sentiment
★ Top manager compensation
★ Incentive compensation

論文目次

摘要 i
ABSTRACT ii
誌謝 iii
目錄 iv
表目錄 v
第一章緒論 1
第一節研究動機 1
第二節研究目的 6
第二章研究方法 7
第一節變數定義 7
第二節研究樣本與模型 12
第三章投資人情緒與股價 13
第一節研究假說與模型 13
第二節實證結果及分析 16
第四章高階經理人薪酬與公司績效之連結 21
第一節研究假說與模型 21
第二節實證結果及分析 24
第五章投資人情緒對薪酬制定之影響 28
第一節研究假說及模型 28
第二節實證結果及分析 33
第三節敏感度分析 39
第四節價格效率性 45
第六章結論與未來建議 52
參考文獻 55

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指導教授

沈信漢(Carl Hsin-Han Shen)

審核日期

2014-6-19

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