收購案後，主併公司與目標公司財務顧問之間開始合作原因之探討

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姓名

徐士哲(Shih-Che Hsu) 查詢紙本館藏

畢業系所

財務金融學系

論文名稱

收購案後，主併公司與目標公司財務顧問之間開始合作原因之探討
(The Reason Why Acquirers Start Cooperating with Unfamiliar Target Advisors after M&As)

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摘要(中)

本研究主要探討，若在過往不曾合作過的公司與財務顧問於一次的收購案當中，一方扮演主併公司、另一方扮演目標公司之財務顧問，則在這次收購案後，有哪些因素可能影響合併後的公司考量是否聘用該次收購案當中的目標公司財務顧問。本研究假設目標公司之財務顧問在面對該目標公司於市場上最後一次的交易，可能面對終期問題(Last period problem)而在顧問費用(Advisory fee)與收購溢酬(Target premium)上做出傷害目標公司利益之行為。實證結果顯示，終期問題的決策在本研究議題上並非主要的結果。我們無法找到強烈的證據顯示在該次併購案中，目標公司之財務顧問若收取較高額的顧問費用，則未來受到合併公司繼續聘用的比率較低。而且於收購溢酬上，則完全沒有發現其與未來合併公司與當次收購案中的目標公司財務顧問有顯著關係的證據。另一方面，本研究發現若主併公司以現金支付收購案的比例越低，未來合併公司與目標公司財務顧問合作的可能性越高。原因可能是目標公司過去的管理階層在持有股票數量越高的狀況下，其對合併公司管理階層決策的影響能力也隨之上升。而且過往與目標公司合作過的財務顧問也相較之下比較了解目標公司的狀況，會使得原本的管理階層有意願再度顧用該顧問以進行後續的合作。

摘要(英)

In this study, we focus on the relationship between target’s financial advisors and the combined firms in a M&A deal. If there was no relationship which means cooperation between target advisor and acquirer, then in what circumstances will the combined firm start cooperating with the target advisor afterward? We assume that when target advisors confront the last trade on target companies, there may be a Last Period Problem and advisors may decide to take some harmful actions which are like charging a higher advisory fee to the target firm and making the target premium lower. Such an action would inversely affect the probability of being hired by the combined firm in the future. On the one hand, the empirical study shows the result that in univariate test, the higher the advisory fee charged by target advisors, the lower the probability to cooperate with combined firms in the future. However, we cannot find solid evidence on the way target premium affects the cooperating opportunity. On the other hand, we find that the higher the proportion of the deal is paid by stock, the higher probability that the combined firm will hire the target advisor in the future. The possible reason is that once the manager from target firms has more stocks from acquirer firm, he/she can be more influential to make some decisions on choosing financial advisors.

關鍵字(中)

★ 收購案
★ 終期問題
★ 影響力
★ 目標公司財務顧問
★ 合作機率

關鍵字(英)

★ M&A
★ last period problem
★ influence
★ target advisor
★ probability of cooperation

論文目次

摘要 v
Abstract vi
目錄 1
表目錄 2
圖目錄 2
第一章緒論 3
第二章假說建立 8
2.1 假說1. 終期問題假說 8
2.2 假說2. 影響力假說 9
第三章研究方法 10
3.1資料來源與變數衡量 10
3.2 研究方法 16
第四章實證結果與分析 21
4.1 敘述性統計與相關性分析 21
4.2 單變量分析 26
4.2.1 單一變數檢定 26
4.2.2 單變量交乘分析 30
4.3 多變量分析 32
4.4 討論 38
第五章研究結論 43
參考文獻 45

參考文獻

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指導教授

李韋憲(Wei-Hsien Li)

審核日期

2014-7-21

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