博碩士論文 101430013 詳細資訊




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姓名 林宜萱(Yi-Shuan Lin)  查詢紙本館藏   畢業系所 會計研究所
論文名稱 審計委員會與薪酬委員會成員重疊在經理人權益薪酬與企業風險承擔關係中扮演之角色
(The Role of Overlapping Membership on Audit and Compensation Committees in the Relationship between Executive Equity Compensation and Firm Risk-Taking)
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摘要(中) 美國沙賓法案於2002年後要求公開發行公司設立審計委員會,本研究旨在探討當審計委員會成員同時任職薪酬委員會時,是否能透過知識外溢的效果,提供更好的監督品質。首先測試經理人之權益薪酬與較高的經理人風險承擔是否有關係,以及薪酬與審計委員會成員之重疊對經理人風險承擔之影響。隨後探討透過薪酬與審計委員會成員之重疊是否能改善因為權益薪酬而導致之經理人風險承擔的水準。
研究結果發現經理人之權益薪酬會導致較高的經理人風險承擔,以及薪酬與審計委員會成員之重疊對於經理人風險承擔有負向的影響。本研究結果也顯示雖然審計與薪酬委員會成員重疊能隨低企業風險承擔,但是其對於權益薪酬與企業風險承擔之間的關係是既沒有正向影響也沒有負向影響的。
摘要(英) The Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002(SOX) requires that the audit committee be set by public companies. This study examines whether there’s the effect of knowledge spillover to provide a better monitoring when firms’ audit and compensation committees overlap. First, we investigate whether there’s a relationship between board overlapping and market measure of risk for a sample of industrial companies during the period of 2002-2012, and whether executive equity compensation have influence on risk-taking of firms. Then, we examined the effect of overlapping membership on audit and compensation committees in the relationship between executive equity compensation and risk-taking.
As a result, the equity-based compensation hold by executives induces firm risk-taking, while director overlap is negatively associated with risk-taking. The research results also suggest that the overlapping membership on audit and compensation committees is not associated with the relationship between executive equity compensation and firm risk-taking.
關鍵字(中) ★ 風險承擔
★ 董事會重疊
★ 權益薪酬
★ 風險趨避
★ 審計與薪酬委員會重疊
★ 誘因薪酬
關鍵字(英) ★ risk-taking
★ overlap
★ equity-based compensation
★ risk aversion
★ audit and compensation committees overlap
★ incentive compensation
論文目次 摘要 I
謝辭 III
目錄 V
圖目錄 VI
表目錄 VII
一、緒論 1
1-1 研究背景與介紹 1
1-2 研究目的 4
1-3 研究架構 5
二、文獻與假說發展 6
2-1 代理問題與經理人薪資結構 6
2-1-1 代理問題 6
2-1-2 以權益薪酬解決代理問題 7
2-2 經理人薪資結構與企業風險承擔行為 9
2-2-1 利益一致理論與風險承擔理論 9
2-2-2 權益薪酬與風險承擔 10
2-3 企業風險承擔行為和審計與薪酬委員會成員重疊 13
2-3-1 董事會 13
2-3-2 審計委員會 13
2-3-3 薪酬委員會 14
2-3-4 審計與薪酬委員會成員重疊 14
2-3-5 審計與薪酬委員會重疊對風險承擔的影響 15
2-4 研究假說 18
三、研究方法與資料來源 20
3-1 資料來源與樣本選取 20
3-2 變數定義 22
3-2-1 主要變數 22
3-2-2 控制變數 24
3-3 研究模型設計 30
3-3-1 雙指標市場模型(two-index market model) 30
3-3-2 實證模型 30
四、實證結果 34
4-1 敘述統計分析 34
4-2 相關係數分析 37
4-3 多元迴歸分析 39
4-3-1 模型一 39
4-3-2 模型二 41
4-3-3 模型三 43
五、結論 58
參考文獻 59
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指導教授 盧佳琪(Chia-Chi Lu) 審核日期 2014-8-26
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