代理問題、公司治理與銷管費用僵固性

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姓名

李芳如(Fang-ru Lee) 查詢紙本館藏

畢業系所

會計研究所

論文名稱

代理問題、公司治理與銷管費用僵固性
(The Agency Problem, Corporate Governance, and Stickiness of SG&A Costs)

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摘要(中)

摘要

先前研究主要將成本僵固性解釋為經濟因素，而忽略管理者自利動機對成本習性的影響。因此，本研究控制已知的經濟因素，探討經理人建立帝國動機所引起銷管費用僵固性，我們使用四種變數(自由現金流量、經理人任期、經理人即將卸任、變動薪酬)以捕捉由代理問題所引起經理人建立帝國動機。此外，本研究也探討公司治理能夠減弱代理問題對銷管費用僵固性的影響，其中公司治理變數包括董事會規模、董事長不兼總經理、獨立董事比率、法人持股比率。

本研究以2005年至2012年間台灣上市、上櫃、興櫃公司作為研究對象，實證結果發現，自由現金流量越高、總經理任期越長、總經理即將卸任，所引起經理人建立帝國的動機與SG&A僵固性呈正相關。此外，我們也發現，董事會規模越小、獨立董事比率越高、法人持股比率越高，越能夠減弱由代理問題所引起銷管費用僵固性。

摘要(英)

Abstract
Prior studies have predominantly explained cost stickiness with economic factors and have largely ignored the impact of managerial incentives on cost behavior. Therefore, this study is to examine the manager’s empire building incentives that lead to SG&A costs stickiness, after controlling for known economic factors. We use four variables to capture manager’s empire building incentives arising from the agency problem: free cash flow (FCF), chief executive officer (CEO) horizon, tenure, and variable pay. In addition, we also examine the corporate governance would mitigate the effect of the agency problem on SG&A costs stickiness. Our governance variables are the size of the board, CEO and Chairman separate, the ratio of outside directors, the ratio of institutional investor’ ownership.
We used companies listed on TSE, OTC, and Emerging-Market in Taiwan from 2005 to 2012 as sample. The empirical result shows while FCF is higher, CEO’s tenure is longer and CEO recently expect to leave , Manager’s empire building incentives be more positive associated with SG&A costs stickiness. Moreover, we also found that the size of the board is smaller, the ratio of outside directors is higher and the ratio of institutional investor ownership is higher would mitigate the effect of the agency problem on SG&A costs stickiness.

關鍵字(中)

★ 代理問題
★ 公司治理
★ 銷管費用僵固性

關鍵字(英)

★ Agency Problem
★ Corporate Governance
★ Stickiness of SG&A Costs

論文目次

目錄
摘要 i
abstract ii
致謝 iii
目錄 iv
圖表目錄 v
第壹章緒論 1
第一節研究動機及目的 1
第二節研究問題 2
第三節研究流程 2
第貳章文獻探討 4
第一節成本僵固性 4
第二節代理問題與SG&A僵固性之關聯 6
第三節公司治理減輕代理問題所引起之SG&A僵固性 8
第參章研究方法 10
第一節觀念性架構及建立研究假說 10
第二節研究模型之建立與變數衡量 17
第三節資料來源與樣本選擇 22
第四節資料分析方法 23
第肆章實證結果及分析 24
第一節敘述性統計分析 24
第二節相關係數分析 25
第三節實證分析結果 27
第伍章研究結論、貢獻、建議及限制 34
第一節研究結論 34
第二節研究貢獻 35
第三節研究限制 36
第四節研究建議 37
參考文獻 38

參考文獻

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曾聯洲，2003，〈銷管費用僵固性之研究〉，碩士論文，國立政治大學會計研究所。
楊昌智，2005，〈銷管費用僵固性之個案研究－以國內買賣業為例〉，碩士論文，私立輔仁大學會計研究所。
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指導教授

陳建中

審核日期

2014-7-9

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