| 摘要(英) |
Nowadays, numerous websites embed the social plugins, such as Facebook Like button and Google “+1” button. Users interact with the websites by using social plugins. Websites utilize social plugins to improve the exposure. However, whether users trigger the social plugins or not, all web pages which they visited are tracked by social networking service. Hence, social networking service causes the user privacy issues. However, most of the users know nothing about this.
We develop a novel method for solving privacy issues on Facebook social plugins. When user browses a webpage with Facebook social plugins, our method prevents social plugins from sending information about the user privacy. Furthermore, the method enables social plugins not to identify the information of the user. Therefore, our method protects Internet user privacy. The advantage of our method is that it does not affect the user experience by which the user can still see the social plugins on the webpage. In addition, our method can effectively prevent the user from being tracked by Facebook. We implemented our methods on Chrome browser platform, called “PrivCat”. |
| 參考文獻 |
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