資訊不對稱與現金持有及超額現金價值關係之研究—集團企業之觀點

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姓名

許致涵(Chih-han Hsu) 查詢紙本館藏

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企業管理學系

論文名稱

資訊不對稱與現金持有及超額現金價值關係之研究—集團企業之觀點
(The relationship among information asymmetry and cash holdings, the value of corporate excess cash holdings：Evidence from China listed firm)

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摘要(中)

本文主要探討資訊不對稱對於公司現金持有及超額現金持有價值的影響，並加入集團企業及所有權結構，以了解資訊不對稱在各種公司型態對公司現金持有及價值的影響。本研究以2004年至2013年中國上市公司共12,680個觀察值，進行實證分析。實證結果顯示：在中國，資訊不對稱對於現金持有及超額現金價值皆會有負向的影響，顯示在外部治理機制較弱的國家，現金價值主要由代理問題驅動，使得外部投資人對公司所持有的現金產生疑慮，因而減少其現金持有並且降低其超額現金價值之評價；而加入集團企業的考量後，發現當公司屬於集團企業時，資訊不對稱對於現金持有及超額現金價值仍產生負向的影響，顯示集團內複雜組織結構所產生的資訊不對稱，加深投資人對公司現金持有的疑慮，再加上集團所形成的內部資本市場，使得投資人對於集團所持有的超額現金給予負向評價；最後在集團企業中加入所有權結構考量，發現不論是國家或私人持有之集團，資訊不對稱對於現金持有及超額現金價值仍產生負向的影響，顯示集團的組織形式對代理問題的影響支配了所有權結構對代理問題的影響。本文研究結果對資訊不對稱在新興資本市場的管理影響有重要貢獻。

摘要(英)

This research investigates the relationship among cash holdings, value of corporate excess cash holdings and firm-specific information asymmetry. The sample contains the listed firms in China from 2004 to 2013 and obtains 12,680 firm-year observations. Our results support the free cash ﬂow theory and indicate that information asymmetry negatively moderates the relationship between cash holdings and value of corporate excess cash holdings in China. We further divide the sample into group affiliated firms and non-group affiliated firms and find that the negative moderating effect exists in group affiliated firms. Finally, we take ownership structure into account and the negative moderating effect is found in both state-owned group affiliated firms and private group affiliated firms.The results in this study imply show that agency problem of free cash ﬂow dominates the effect of information asymmetry in group affiliated firms.

關鍵字(中)

★ 資訊不對稱
★ 集團企業
★ 所有權結構
★ 現金持有
★ 超額現金持有價值
★ 中國

關鍵字(英)

★ information asymmetry
★ group affiliated firms
★ ownership structure
★ cash holdings
★ the value of corporate excess cash holdings
★ China

論文目次

論文摘要 I
Abstract II
目錄 III
表目錄 IV
一、緒論 1
二、文獻探討與假說建立 5
2-1資訊不對稱與公司現金持有及超額現金價值的關係 5
2-2集團企業與公司現金持有及超額現金價值的關係 7
2-3國有集團企業與公司現金持有及超額現金價值的關係 9
三、研究方法 11
3-1 資料來源與樣本篩選 11
3-2 模型建立 12
3-3變數衡量 14
3-4統計方法 16
四、實證結果與分析 16
4-1、基本敘述性統計分析 17
4-2多變量分析結果 28
4-3穩健性分析 40
五、結論與建議 58
5-1研究結論與管理意涵 58
5-2研究建議與限制 59
參考文獻 60

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指導教授

洪榮華、林翠蓉(Jung-hua Hung Tsui-jung Lin)

審核日期

2015-6-10

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