雙通路競爭下探討不同退貨政策 之定價策略

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姓名

張玉玲(Yu-Ling Chang) 查詢紙本館藏

畢業系所

工業管理研究所

論文名稱

雙通路競爭下探討不同退貨政策之定價策略
(Pricing with Dual Channel Competition in Different Return Policies)

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摘要(中)

近年來，有許多廠商將退貨政策，當作一種行銷的手段，如：批發零售業中的連鎖量販店COSTCO、電子資訊業中的宏碁…等，也在其中收到了顯著的成效。退貨政策已跳脫以往被定位在產品售後服務的框架，在各行各業中對於退貨政策的使用已越來越廣泛，現今廠商運用退貨政策對消費者傳達自家產品與品牌形象、使用退貨政策協助通路訂價更有效率，然而施行不同的退貨政策會為通路帶來不同的影響，如何選擇適當的退貨政策，是製造商的一個課題。
　　本研究主要以依據Padmanabhan 與 Png （1997）基本模型，加入兩種不同銷售通路來延伸分析，在不退貨及全額退貨政策下，探討雙通路擁有不同退貨政策對於製造商、實體零售商及網路商店的定價與利潤有何影響。進而討論不同消費者在不同的退貨成本下，製造商究竟該採取何種的退貨政策對其有最佳的利潤。
　　當製造商採取全額退貨政策，主要目的是分攤零售商存貨風險，進而提升零售商的產品訂購量，而研究結果顯示製造商施行全額退貨政策可使得零售商產品訂購量提升，進而提高製造商及零售商之利潤，表示全額退貨政策確實有達到製造商之預期效果。但在價格敏感係數和價格競爭力較小時，會導致零售商產品訂購量減少，造成整體通路利潤下降，在此情境下施行不退貨政策對於製造商和零售商之利潤而言較好。

摘要(英)

In recent years, many manufacturers will use return policies as a strategy of marketing. For example, COSTCO, the wholesale and retail chain, Acer, the industry of electronic information ... etc., which also show significant results. It is obvious for manufactures think outside the box of product after-sales service. Product after-sales service, has become more common in various industries. Manufacturers use the return policy to propaganda their products and brand image. Moreover, it can help distributors to set a price more efficient. However, the different return policies will lead to different impact for distributors. It is a top issue for them to choose the appropriate return policy.
This study was mainly use Padmanabhan and Png (1997) as the basic model, and added two different sales channels as a variants to analysis whether dual-channel without return or full return policy will lead a different pricing and profit impact for manufacturers, retailers and online stores. Furthermore, this study pay attention on the best interest of the return policy for the manufacturers.
When manufacturers take full return policy, the main purpose is trying to share the inventory risk with retailers. Thus, they enhance the amount of products ordering quantity. The results show that the implementation of full return policy will increase the amount of goods ordered, thereby increasing profits of manufacturers and retailers. The research has anticipate indicates full return policy effect for the manufacturers. However, retailers will reduced product order quantity when the price-sensitive factor and price competitiveness are low. Low price-sensitive factor and price competitiveness lead the whole channel profit decline. In this circumstance, implementing no return policy is the better decision for both manufacturers and retailers.

關鍵字(中)

★ 多通路
★ 退貨政策
★ 價格競爭
★ Stackelberg賽局

關鍵字(英)

★ Multi-channel
★ Return policy
★ Price competition
★ Game theory

論文目次

摘要 i
Abstract ii
目錄 iii
圖目錄 v
表目錄 vi
第一章緒論 1
1.1 研究背景與動機 1
1.2 研究目的 2
1.3 研究架構 3
第二章文獻回顧 4
2.1 多通路 4
2.1.1 通路的定義 4
2.1.2通路的結構 5
2.1.3 多通路協調 6
2.2 退貨政策 7
2.3 價格競爭 7
第三章模型建構 12
3.1 情境描述 12
3.2 模型基本假設與符號定義 14
3.2.1 本研究的基本假設 14
3.2.2 參數及決策變數設定 15
3.3 模型建構 16
3.3.1 不退貨政策 17
3.3.2 全額退貨政策 21
第四章模型分析 26
4.1參數設定 26
4.2 數值分析 27
4.3 決策變數與參數之關係 28
4.4 敏感度分析 30
4.4.1 市場規模 30
4.4.2 價格敏感係數 31
4.4.3 價格競爭力 33
4.4.4 製造成本 34
第五章結論與未來研究方向 37
5.1 結論 37
5.2 研究貢獻 38
5.2 未來研究方向 38
參考文獻 39
附錄 42

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指導教授

陳振明

審核日期

2016-6-28

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