高階經理人異動之決定因素：二元與多元羅吉斯迴歸分析

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姓名

柯欣妤(Hsin-yu Ke) 查詢紙本館藏

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人力資源管理研究所

論文名稱

高階經理人異動之決定因素：二元與多元羅吉斯迴歸分析
(Determinants of Management Turnover: Binary and Multinomial Logistic Regression Analyses)

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摘要(中)

回顧有關高階經理人之研究，多數僅考量經理人有無異動，尚未有太多研究針對經理人異動分類進行分析，而電子產業及金融產業高階經理人異動較傳統產業頻繁，現已有金融產業相關的研究分析，故本研究選擇鎖定電子產業，並深入探討2009年至2013年影響經理人異動的決定因素。
藉文獻回顧將導致經理人異動原因鎖定具有制衡效果及影響管理決策的企業績效及公司治理變項，其資料來源取自台灣經濟新報(TEJ)相關資料庫。而高階經理人異動樣本來源取自公開資訊觀測站公告電子產業上市公司之高階經理人異動資訊，共1844家企業，並依據本研究彙整學者對異動類別的定義表(表2-1)，判斷經理人異動原因可歸類為強迫性異動或自願性異動，接著分析高階經理人異動與企業績效及公司治理要素的相互影響關係。
本研究透過描述性統計的平均值及標準差了解各變項樣本特性，並進行相關係數分析變項間的相互關聯，而後運用二元及多元羅吉斯迴歸探究經理人異動與企業績效和公司治理要素間的正負影響性及管理意涵。從研究結果可得知企業績效及公司治理可在適當時機發揮其效力以監督經理人達到企業和股東共同目標，尤其相較經理人自願性異動，會計績效、外部董事比率、高階經理人持股比及法人機構持股比對強迫性異動更具有顯著影響效果。

摘要(英)

In previous articles, the research of executive managers mainly discussed the management turnover but not go into the topic of analyzing the type of management turnover.
This study is to examine the relationships among management turnover type, corporate performance and corporate governance. The types of management turnover in this study are forced turnover and voluntary turnover.
The sample of executive manager change is extracted from the data of Market Observation Post System with the period from 2009 to 2013; including 1844 public-listed electronics companies. The data of corporate performance and corporate governance are obtained from Taiwan Economic Journal (TEJ).
By using logistic regression analyze, we found that the factors of management turnover are associated with ROA, the ratio of outside directors, executive manager ownership ratio and institutional ownership ratio. And the result shows that forced turnover is more significantly associated with the factors than voluntary turnover.

關鍵字(中)

★ 經理人異動
★ 公司治理
★ 企業績效
★ 電子產業
★ 羅吉斯迴歸分析

關鍵字(英)

★ management turnover
★ corporate governance
★ corporate performance
★ electronics industry
★ Logistic regression analysis

論文目次

目錄
中文摘要 i
英文摘要 ii
目錄 iii
圖目錄 iv
表目錄 v
第一章緒論 1
第一節研究動機與目的 1
第二節本文架構 2
第三節本文研究流程 3
第二章文獻探討與假說 4
第一節異動類別 4
第二節企業績效與高階經理人異動 7
第三節公司治理與高階經理人異動 9
第三章研究方法 15
第一節研究模型與研究假說 15
第二節變數定義與衡量 17
第三節研究樣本與研究期間 20
第四節二元與多元羅吉斯迴歸分析 22
第四章實證結果與分析 23
第一節描述性統計分析結果 23
第二節相關係數分析結果 25
第三節二元與多元羅吉斯迴歸分析結果 26
第五章結論建議與研究限制 31
第一節研究結論與貢獻 31
第二節研究限制與建議 33
參考文獻 35

參考文獻

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指導教授

陳明園(Ming-yuan Chen)

審核日期

2015-7-20

推文