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姓名 陳柏勳(Po-Shun Chen)  查詢紙本館藏   畢業系所 財務金融學系
論文名稱 CEO年齡與選擇併購目標公司之偏好
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摘要(中) 此篇主要探討不同年齡的高階經理人(CEO)在挑選目標公司選擇時是否具有偏好,假設CEO將透過併購行為來達成個人的利益,因此本研究以影響薪酬的因素分為了成長性價值,風險承擔以及內部影響,並依照年齡與行為的關聯性發展出五個主要假說,依序包括資產市帳值比,R&D費用,跨產業,舉債及工會率。實證結果顯示年輕CEO偏選擇成長性高的目標公司,而在風險則沒有明確的結果。另外,工會率的單變量分析中對於不同的CEO年齡有顯著的影響力,但在多變量分析中則無結果。在研究的最後進行了穩健性分析,探討管理階層對於併購案挑選目標公司的影響力,發現董事會的影響力的確存在於併購目標選擇偏好中,且成長性價值的影響效果依然顯著。
摘要(英) Prior work has established that CEO age influence their acquisition propensity because of compensation incentive. In this study, I focus on the relationship between CEO age and target firm selection. We explore three factors influencing CEO compensation, growth, risk and labor friction. Based on these factors, I test five hypotheses to test whether CEO age affects the preference selecting acquisition targets. I choose market-to-book-ratio-asset and R&D intensity to proxy for growth and cross-industry acquisition and total leverage ratio to proxy for risk. The friction between CEO and other employees is known to adversely affect the CEO’s compensation, and I choose union intensity to proxy labor friction. I show that younger CEOs prefer to choose targets with higher growth opportunities, but CEO with different ages do not choose target differently in terms of firm risk. On the other hand, I find some evidence that younger CEOs prefer targets with weaker union power. I further examine the robustness of main results with additional controls like other management characteristics and board characteristics. While board of directors has some influences on target selection, the younger CEOs’ preference in growth firms remains.
關鍵字(中) ★ 高階經理人年齡
★ 併購偏好
★ 目標公司挑選
★ 薪酬
關鍵字(英) ★ CEO age
★ acquisition propensity
★ target selection
★ compensation
論文目次 摘要.....................iv
Abstract.................v
目錄.....................vi
表目錄...................vii
圖目錄...................vii
第一章 緒論...............1
第二章 文獻回顧...........4
第三章 假說建立...........8
第四章 研究方法..........13
第五章 實證結果與分析.... .16
5.1 敘述統計分析..........16
5.2 迴歸分析..............19
5.2.1 資產市帳值比........19
5.2.2 R&D費用率..........21
5.2.3 跨產業併購..........23
5.2.4 總槓桿比率..........25
5.2.5 工會影響力..........27
第六章 穩健性分析.........29
第七章 結論..............32
參考文獻..................34
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指導教授 李韋憲(Wei-Hsien Li) 審核日期 2015-7-16
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