企業社會責任與經理人報酬機制設計

以作者查詢圖書館館藏

、以作者查詢臺灣博碩士

、以作者查詢全國書目

、勘誤回報

、線上人數：17

、訪客IP：3.16.76.43

姓名

陳秋如(Chiu-ru Chen) 查詢紙本館藏

畢業系所

產業經濟研究所在職專班

論文名稱

企業社會責任與經理人報酬機制設計

相關論文

★ 期間利差與經濟衰退之預測模型-理性預期假設之驗證	★ 台灣、美國總經月數據與台股股價指數之關聯性
★ 台灣資訊電子產業異質性及利潤率之探討	★ 中小企業案件逾期放款之預測
★ 台灣半導體產業經營效率分析－三階段資料包絡分析法之應用	★ 台灣車輛產業經濟附加價值之研究－兼論影響信通交通器材公司經濟附加價值之因素
★ 外人直接投資與研發活動之關聯性-台灣電子相關產業之實證研究	★ 消費性信用貸款授信評量模式之研究
★ 二順位房貸產品風險預警分析	★ 新產品商業化流程之個案研究–以美商3M公司為例
★ 高淨值客戶風險屬性與共同基金投資報酬率之實證研究	★ 台灣加權指數與指數股票型基金風險值之歷史模擬法分析
★ 國際油價、匯率與利率之動態關聯—VECM與VECM-GARCH之應用	★ 主流記憶體之二十年價格模式研究與驗證
★ 以DEA模型分析桃園郵局之營運績效	★ 奢侈稅實施對都會地區房價之衝擊反應分析

檔案

[Endnote RIS 格式]

[Bibtex 格式]

[相關文章]

[文章引用]

[完整記錄]

[館藏目錄]

[檢視]

[下載]

本電子論文使用權限為同意立即開放。
已達開放權限電子全文僅授權使用者為學術研究之目的，進行個人非營利性質之檢索、閱讀、列印。
請遵守中華民國著作權法之相關規定，切勿任意重製、散佈、改作、轉貼、播送，以免觸法。

摘要(中)

本論文探討廠商業主如何在致力於從事企業社會責任 (Corporate Social Responsibility, CSR) 活動的努力下，設計委任經理人的CSR誘因報酬比例機制。假定在寡占市場內，僅有兩家廠商，並且生產差異化的產品。此市場內的消費者具有CSR意識，且能觀察到廠商的CSR活動努力程度。兩家廠商將決定是否從事CSR活動，以及是否委任經理人從事CSR活動和生產決策。經理人願意投入多少CSR的努力程度，取決於廠商所設計的CSR誘因報酬比例，因此本論文假設了廠商業主委任經理人從事CSR活動努力的程度及產量相關的報酬比例，探討當廠商業主決定從事CSR活動與否，所應面臨委任經理人的報酬比例機制。廠商業主以利潤最大化為目標，決定應給予經理人的報酬比例，而經理人以報酬最大化為目標，決定接受委任後所應從事的CSR活動努力程度及產量。我們發現，當消費者具有CSR意識時，廠商從事CSR活動的均衡產量、價格及利潤均高於不從事CSR活動的均衡產量、價格及利潤。因此，廠商選擇致力於從事CSR活動的努力程度，藉以提高利潤。而在分權管理的經營模式下，廠商業主將以最適正向的產量報酬比例，促使經理人達成從事CSR活動的目標。

摘要(英)

This dissertation investigates how firms’ owners design the incentive schemes for hiring managers to do the production and corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities. We consider an oligopoly market that consists of two firms. The two firms produce the differentiated products. The consumers prefer and can observe CSR behavior provided by the firms. Each firm’s owner considers to undertake CSR activities or not, and whether hire a manager. Each firm’s owner first designs a reward mechanism for the proportion his/her manager reward base upon maximizing profit. A manager decides its firm’s CSR activities effort and output level base upon maximizing his/her reward that designed by owner. We find that when the consumers prefer CSR activities, equilibrium outputs, prices, and profits are all higher under CSR activities than no CSR activities are undertaken. Therefore, the firms would choose to undertake CSR activities. Besides, if the owner decides to hire the managers, the reward mechanism should be designed optimally a postive reward proportion of production to achieve its objective of undertake CSR activities.

關鍵字(中)

★ 企業社會責任
★ 所有者-經理人分權
★ 寡占競爭

關鍵字(英)

★ corporate social responsibility (CSR)
★ owner-manager delegation
★ oligopolistic competition

論文目次

中文摘要………………………… i
英文摘要………………………… ii
誌謝辭…………………………… iii
目錄……………………………… iv
第一章緒論 1
第一節研究動機與目的 1
第二節論文架構 7
第二章文獻回顧 8
第三章理論模型 13
第一節模型設定 13
第二節賽局說明 17
第三節賽局的均衡分析 18
3-3-1賽局Ⅰ (不委任經理人，不從事CSR活動) 18
3-3-2賽局Ⅱ (不委任經理人，從事CSR活動) 20
3-3-3賽局Ⅲ (委任經理人，不從事CSR活動) 23
3-3-4賽局Ⅳ (委任經理人，從事CSR活動) 26
第四章結果分析 34
第五章結論 38
參考文獻 41

參考文獻

酒井明彥(2015)，「委任與CSR」，《CSRone專欄》，取自http://www.csronereporting.com/topic#0, (2015年11月26日)。
Bagnoli, M. and S. G. Watts (2003),“Selling to socially responsible consumers: Competition and the private provision of public goods,” Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 12(3), 419–445.
Baron, D. P. (2008), “Managerial contracting and corporate social responsibility,”Journal of Public Economics, 92, 268–288.
Bergmann, T. J. and V. G. Scarpello (2001), Compensation Decision Making (4th) , Harcourt College.
Berle, A. A. and C. G. Means (1932) , The Modern Corporation and Private Property, New York: Macmillan.
Besley, T. and M. Ghatak (2005),“Competition and incentives with motivated agents,”American Economic Review, 95(3), 616–636.
Besley, T. and M. Ghatak (2007), “Retailing public goods: The economics of corporate social responsibility,”Journal of Public Economics, 91, 1645 – 1663.
Brisley, N., A. Bris and C. Cabolis (2011) ,“A theory of optimal expropriation, mergers and industry competition,”Journal of Banking and Finance, 35, 955–965.
Fernández-Kranz, D. and J. Santaló (2010) ,“When necessity becomes a virtue: The effect of product market competition on corporate social responsibility,”Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 19(2), 453–487.
García-Gallego, A. and N. Georgantzís (2009) ,“Market effects of changes in consumer’s social responsibility,”Journal of Economics and Management Strategy,19, 235–262.
Hay, R. and Ed Gray (1974),“Social responsibilities of business managers,” The Academy of Management Journal, 17(1), 135–143.
Kopel, M. and B. Brand (2012) , “Socially responsible firms and endogenous choice of strategic incentives,” Economic Modelling , 29(3) , 982–989.
Manasakis, C., E. Mitrokostas, and E. Petrakis (2013),“ Certification of corporate social responsibility activities in oligopolistic markets”, Canadian Journal of Economics, 46(1), 282–309.
Manasakis, C., E. Mitrokostas, and E. Petrakis (2013) ,“Social responsibility activities and corporate governance in imperfectly competitive markets,” Managerial and Decision Economics, 35(7), 460–473.
Miller, N. and Amit Pazgal (2001),“The equivalence of price and quantity competition with delegation,”The RAND Journal of Economics, 32, 284–301.
Miller, N. and Amit Pazgal (2002),“Relative performance as a strategic commitment mechanism,” Managerial and Decision Economics, 23, 51–68.
Roth, B. (2015),“CSR wins customers and sells products strategic corporate,” Triple Pundit.com, http://www.triplepundit.com/2015/10/csr-wins-customers-sells-products (accessed on Thursday, Oct 15th, 2015).

指導教授

邱俊榮、陳忠榮(Jiunn-Rong Chiou Jong-Rong Chen)

審核日期

2016-1-27

推文