博碩士論文 103421006 詳細資訊




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姓名 王芯(Hsin Wang)  查詢紙本館藏   畢業系所 企業管理學系
論文名稱 所有權結構與政治連結對關係人交易 之影響——以中國上市公司為例
(The impacts of ownership structure and political connections on related party transactions:Evidence from Chinese listed firms)
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摘要(中) 本研究探討不同所有權結構以及是否存在政治連結對於關係人交易之影響。透過比較不同所有權結構有無政治連結對於關係人交易之影響,探討中國上市企業是否使用關係人交易作為利益輸送手段,並比較其差異。本研究以中國上海與深圳上市公司為研究樣本,為避開2006年關係人交易改革對研究結果之影響,因此以2008年至2014年作為樣本期間進行實證分析。研究結果顯示,國營企業與關係人交易呈正相關而非國營企業中之政治連結與關係人交易呈負相關。進一步對非國營企業不同所有權間比較有無政治連結對關係人交易之影響。結果顯示,境內法人最為顯著,其次為境外法人,最後為家族企業。本研究結果可作為政府及投資人評估中國上市企業差異及投資風險之參考。
摘要(英) This research investigates the impacts of different ownership structures and political connections on related party transactions. Through making comparisons between different ownership structure with or without political connections, we examine whether Chinese listed firms use related party transactions to tunnel and analyze the differences between them. Our sample includes listed firms of Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges. We collect our data from 2008 to 2014 to avoid the potential effect of the reform on related party transactions in 2006. We find that state-owned enterprises are positively related to related party transactions, while political connections in non-state-owned enterprises are negatively related to related party transactions. It indicates that non-state-owned enterprises consider political connections as resources to improve their competitive advantages rather than a channel to tunnel. We further investigate whether different identities of the controlling shareholders in non-state-owned enterprises with or without political connections have different impacts on related party transactions. The results show that domestic institutional investors have the most significantly positive effect on related party transactions, foreign institutional investors are the second, and family businesses are the least. This study provides the government and market participants with references to evaluate the differences and risks between different ownership structures with political connections in Chinese listed firms.
關鍵字(中) ★ 所有權結構
★ 政治連結
★ 關係人交易
★ 利益輸送
關鍵字(英) ★ ownership structures
★ political connections
★ related party transactions
★ tunneling
論文目次 摘要 i
Abstract ii
目錄 iii
表目錄 iv
第一章 緒論 1
1-1 研究動機與目的 1
1-2 研究架構 3
第二章 文獻探討與假說建立 4
2-1 關係人交易 4
2-2 政治連結 5
2-3 中央控制與地方控制之國營企業對關係人交易之影響 6
2-4 非國營企業與政治連結對關係人交易之影響 6
2-4-1 境內法人與境外法人政治連結對關係人交易影響之差異 7
2-4-2 境內法人與家族企業政治連結對關係人交易影響之差異 8
2-4-3 家族企業與境外法人政治連結對關係人交易影響之差異 9
第三章 研究方法 11
3-1 資料來源與樣本篩選 11
3-2 研究方法及模型建立 11
第四章 實證結果與分析 15
4-1 敘述性統計與相關性分析 15
4-2 迴歸分析 20
4-3 穩健性測試 34
第五章 結論與建議 43
5-1 研究結論 43
5-2 研究限制與建議 44
參考文獻 45
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指導教授 洪榮華 審核日期 2016-6-15
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