公司治理與股權結構對資訊透明度之關聯性

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姓名

彭偉卿(Wei-Chin Peng) 查詢紙本館藏

畢業系所

會計研究所

論文名稱

公司治理與股權結構對資訊透明度之關聯性
(Information transparency, corporate governance,and ownership structure)

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摘要(中)

本篇主要探討企業公司治理結構和股權結構與資訊透明度的關聯性。由於資訊透明度是公司治理機制中重要的環節，提高資訊透明度也有助於降低資訊不對稱，並穩定資本市場發展。本篇研究以台灣資訊揭露評鑑系統評估結果為基準，以2008年至2014年台灣上市公司為樣本，以線性迴歸模型進行實證分析，結果發現公司治理因子中，董事會大小、獨立董監事兼職、設置審計委員會與四大會計師事務所查核與資訊透明度呈正向顯著關係，而監事規模與董事長雙重性則呈現顯著負向關係;以股權結構因子層面實證發現，董事會持股、外資法人持股、本國政府機構持股與經理人持股四項比率高，資訊透明度較佳，而監察人持股、最終控制者個人持股比率高則與資訊透明度呈反向且顯著關係。故本研究可供投資人與相關政府機構思考那些因素會影響企業資訊透明度之水準，以便未來提升資訊揭露水準與保障投資人權益作為參考。

摘要(英)

The discussion in this study is mainly about corporate governance and ownership structure in relation to information transparency. Since information transparency has been a necessary part of the activities of corporate governance, improving information transparency helps lowering information asymmetry as well as stabilizing the development of capital markets.
This study is based on Taiwan Information Disclosure and Transparency Rankings System and selected listed company for the period of 2008 to 2014 as the sample. The empirical analysis result shows that the board size, independent director and supervisors, The Audit Committee, and audit from Big Four Firms have significantly positive relations with information transparency. Reversely, the result shows the scale of supervisors and CEO duality have negative relations with information transparency. Additionally, in the aspect of the factor of shareholding structure revealed the following facts. In considering the ownership of board, outsider, government organization, and managers, the higher the shareholding ratio is, the better the information transparency is. On the contrary, in considering the ownership of supervisors and controlling shareholders, the higher the shareholding ratio is, the worse the information transparency is.
As the result, this study can provide investors and government organizations with the factors which will influence the level of corporate information transparency, so as to improve the level of information disclosure and ensure investors’ equity in the future.

關鍵字(中)

★ 公司治理
★ 股權結構
★ 資訊透明度
★ 代理問題

關鍵字(英)

論文目次

摘要 i
ABSTRACT ii
誌謝 iii
目錄 iv
圖目錄 v
表目錄 vi
第一章、緒論 1
第二章、文獻回顧與假說發展 5
2-1 文獻探討 5
2-1-1公司治理與股權結構 5
2-1-2資訊揭露與台灣資訊揭露評鑑系統 7
2-1-3公司治理及股權結構與資訊透明度 9
2-2 假說建立 10
第三章研究設計 15
3-1 樣本選取 15
3-2 實證模型建立與變數定義之衡量 17
第四章、實證結果 25
4-1 敘述性統計分析 25
4-2實證結果與分析 31
4-2-1 公司治理結構與資訊透明度 31
4-2-2公司股權結構與資訊透明度 37
第五章、研究結論與建議 43
參考文獻 46

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Shanghai. China

指導教授

郭南廷、陳建中

審核日期

2016-6-14

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