共同成員及執行長誘因薪酬

以作者查詢圖書館館藏

、以作者查詢臺灣博碩士

、以作者查詢全國書目

、勘誤回報

、線上人數：11

、訪客IP：3.138.122.195

姓名

葉筱靖(Hsiao-Ching Yeh) 查詢紙本館藏

畢業系所

會計研究所

論文名稱

共同成員及執行長誘因薪酬
(Common Membership and CEO Incentive Compensation)

相關論文

★ 申請首次公開發行過程分析 -以LED 產業之A 公司為例	★ 探討美元匯率與臺股指數變化之關係
★ 台灣血糖檢測儀產業的商業模式探討 -以產業領導廠商為例	★ 台灣上市公司董監薪酬與公司績效之關聯性 -以電子零組件產業為例
★ 企業資源規劃系統-典型ERP與非典型ERP之比較	★ 執行長誘因獎酬，會計師特性：沙賓法案前後期
★ 審計委員會財務專家與CEO誘因薪酬:對公司績效與盈餘管理之影響	★ 財務壓力、審計與薪酬委員會成員重疊與審計品質對盈餘管理之影響：真實與應計盈餘管理
★ 盈餘壓力，財務專家對盈餘管理之影響：應計盈餘管理與實質盈餘管理	★ 公司治理、高階經理人薪酬與企業績效敏感度之關連性
★ 強制設置薪酬委員會對高階經理人薪酬與企業績效關係之影響	★ 獨立董事特性、高階經理人現金薪酬與會計績效表現之關聯性
★ 高階經理人誘因薪酬與審計與薪酬委員會成員重疊對公司生產效率之影響	★ 審計委員會與薪酬委員會成員重疊在經理人權益薪酬與企業風險承擔關係中扮演之角色
★ 合併報表與母公司報表之資訊差異對盈餘持續性之影響	★ 雙簽制度下產業專精對查核任期與會計重編間關係之影響

檔案

[Endnote RIS 格式]

[Bibtex 格式]

[相關文章]

[文章引用]

[完整記錄]

[館藏目錄]

至系統瀏覽論文 ( 永不開放)

摘要(中)

本篇論文主要在探討薪酬委員會成員同時為審計委員會成員時，是否會對經理人誘因薪酬制定之效率及效果造成影響。本研究之樣本期間為2003至2010年，共5,828間公司-年觀察值，包含經理人相關資料、公司財務資訊及董事會資料。研究結果發現在總樣本之下，公司有共同成員與經理人誘因薪酬、公司績效及公司真實績效呈現顯著負相關，意味著公司若有重疊成員的話，有可能會造成經理人降低努力誘因及抑制經理人追求風險，同時也讓公司績效及真實績效下降。本研究進一步切割整體樣本後發現，績效較佳之公司，重疊成員與公司績效及真實績效呈現顯著正相關、與盈餘管理呈現顯著負相關，指出績效較好之公司，審計及薪酬委員會成員重疊是一個好的機制，會減緩盈餘管理之產生，以及增加未被管理之績效。

摘要(英)

This paper is to investigate whether the compensation committee members who also serve on the audit committee affect the efficiency and effectiveness of CEO incentive compensation or not. This study uses a sample of 5,828 firm-year observation for the period 2003 to 2010 in the US firms. Including CEO related data, firm’s financial data and director data. We find a significantly negative relationship between common membership and CEO incentive pay and a significantly negative relation between common membership and reported and real performance on the full sample. The implication is that common membership may cause the CEO reduced the effort incentive and decreased risk-taking. Also, common membership may decline the firm’s reported performance and unmanaged performance on the whole sample. Furthermore, we distinguish the full sample and find that firms with good performance is a significantly positive relationship between common membership and reported and real performance, and significantly negative relationship between common membership and earnings management. That means firm with better performance has the compensation committee members who also serve on the audit committee is a good mechanism to ease the earnings management and increase unmanaged performance.

關鍵字(中)

★ 共同成員
★ 審計及薪酬委員會成員重疊
★ 經理人誘因薪酬支付比例
★ 公司績效
★ 盈餘管理

關鍵字(英)

★ common membership
★ overlapping membership
★ CEO incentive pay
★ firm performance
★ earnings management

論文目次

摘要 ........................................................................................................................................ I
Abstract .................................................................................................................................... II
致謝辭 ..................................................................................................................................... III
1. Introduction ...................................................................................................................... 1
2. Literature Review and Research Questions ................................................................... 4
2.1 CEO Incentive Compensation ...................................................................................... 4
2.2 Overlapping Membership on Audit and Compensation Committees ........................... 6
2.3 Research Questions ...................................................................................................... 8
2.3.1 Research Question 1 .......................................................................................... 9
2.3.2 Research Question 2 ........................................................................................ 10
3. Research Method ............................................................................................................ 11
3.1 Data and Sample Selected .......................................................................................... 11
3.2 The efficiency of CEO incentive compensation ......................................................... 12
3.3 The effectiveness of CEO incentive compensation .................................................... 12
3.4 Regression Model ....................................................................................................... 13
3.4.1 Dependent variables ........................................................................................ 14
3.4.2 Independent variables ...................................................................................... 15
3.4.3 Control variables ............................................................................................. 16
4. Empirical Results ............................................................................................................ 19
4.1 Descriptive Statistics .................................................................................................. 19
4.2 Main Results ............................................................................................................... 24
4.2.1 Test the efficiency of Common Membership and CEO incentive
compensation. ........................................................................................................... 24
4.2.2 Test the effectiveness of Common Membership and CEO incentive
compensation. ........................................................................................................... 24
4.2.3 Test the sub-sample of the efficiency of Common Membership and CEO
incentive compensation. ........................................................................................... 29
4.2.4 Test the sub-sample of effectiveness of Common Membership and CEO
incentive compensation. ........................................................................................... 29
5. Robustness Check ........................................................................................................... 34
6. Conclusion ....................................................................................................................... 41
References ................................................................................................................................ 42

參考文獻

Aboody, D., Kasznik, R., 2000. CEO stock option awards and corporate voluntary disclosures. Journal of Accounting and Economics 29, 73-100.
Abowd, J.M., 1990. Does performance-based managerial compensation affect corporate performance? Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 52-73.
Agrawal, A., Chadha, S., 2005. Corporate governance and accounting scandals. Journal of Law and Economics 48, 371-406.
Bebchuk L.A., Fried, J.M., 2003. Executive compensation as an agency problem. The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 71-92.
Bebchuk, L.A., Fried, J.M., 2004, Pay without performance. The Unfilled Promise of Executive Compensation, Harvard University Press, Cambridge.
Becker, G., Stigler, J., 1974. Law enforcement, malfeasance, and compensation of enforcers. Journal of Legal Studies 3, 1-18.
Bergstresser, D., Philippon, T., 2006, CEO incentives and earnings management, Journal of Financial Economics 80, 511-529.
Burns, N., Kedia, S., 2006. The impact of performance-based compensation on misreporting, Journal of Financial Economics 79, 35-67.
Burns, N., Kedia, S., 2008. Executive option exercises and financial misreporting. Journal of Banking & Finance 32 (5), 845-857.
Carpenter ,J.N., Remmers, B., 2001. Executive stock option exercises and inside information. The Journal of Business, 513-534.
Chandar, N., Chang, H., Zheng, X., 2008. Does overlapping membership on audit and compensation committees improve a firm’s financial reporting quality? Drexel University. Working paper, July of Accounting and Economics 28, 151-184.
Cheng, Q., Warfield, T.D., 2005. Equity incentives and earnings management. The Accounting Review 80, 441-476.
Cohen, D.A., Dey, A., Lys, T.Z., 2005. Trends in earnings management and informativeness of earnings announcements in the pre- and post-Sarbanes Oxley periods. Available at SSRN: /http://ssrn.com/abstract=658782S.
Conyon, M.J., Freeman, R.B., 2001. Shared modes of compensation and firm performance: UK evidence. NBER Working Paper Series w8448.
Core, J., Guay, W., 1999. The use of equity grants to manage optimal equity incentive levels. Journal of Accounting and Economics 28, 151-184.
Cornett, M.M., Marcus, A.J., Tehranian, H., 2008. Corporate governance and pay-for-performance: The impact of earnings management. Journal of Financial Economics 87, 357-373.
Dechow, P.M., Sloan, R.G., Sweeney, A.P., 1995. Detecting earnings management. Accounting Review 70, 193-226.
DeFusco, R.A., Zorn, T.S., Johnson, R.R., 1991. The association between executive stock option plan changes and managerial decision making. Financial Management, 20-36.
Demsetz, H., Lehn, K., 1985. The structure of corporate ownership: Causes and consequences. Journal of Political Economy 96, 1155-1177.
Denis, D.J., Hanouna, P., Sarinb, A., 2006. Is there a dark side to incentive compensation? Journal of Corporate Finance 12, 467-488.
Efendi, J., Srivastava, A., Swanson, E.P., 2004. Why do corporate managers misstate financial statements? The role of option compensation, corporate governance, and other factors. Working Paper, Texas A&M University.
Gao, P., Shrieves, R.E., 2002. Earnings management and executive compensation: A case of overdose of option and underdose of salary? Available at SSRN.
Ghosh C., Sirmans, C.F., 2005. On REIT CEO compensation: Does board structure matter? The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics 30(4), 397-428.
Guay, W. R., 1999. The sensitivity of CEO wealth to equity risk: an analysis of the magnitude and determinants. Journal of Financial Economics, 53(1), 43-71.
Hoitash, U., Hoitash, R., 2009. Conflicting objectives within the board: Evidence from overlapping audit and compensation committee members. Group Decision and Negotiation 18 (1), 57-73.
Holmstrom, B., 1979. Moral hazard and observability. Bell Journal of Economics 10, 74-91.
Hribar, P., & Collins, D. W., 2002. Errors in estimating accruals: Implications for empirical research. Journal of Accounting research, 40(1), 105-134.
Jensen, M., 1993. The modern industrial revolution, exit, and the failure of internal control systems, Journal of Finance 48, 831-880.
Jensen, M., Meckling, W., 1976. Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics 3, 305-360.
Jensen, M., 2005. Agency costs of overvalued equity. Financial Management 34, 5-19.
Johnson, S., Ryan, H.E., Tian, Y.S., 2003. Executive compensation and corporate fraud. Working paper, Louisiana State University.
Jones, J. J., 1991. Earnings management during import relief investigations. Journal of Accounting Research:193-228.
Kothari, S.P., Leone, A.J., Wasley, C.E., 2005. Performance matched discretionary accrual measures. Journal of Accounting and Economics 39, 163-197.
Laux, C., Laux, V., 2008. Board committees, CEO compensation and earnings management. Goethe University. Working Paper, February. Journal of Disclosure and Governance 4 (2), 132-144.
Lazear, E., 1979. Why is there mandatory retirement? Journal of Political Economy 87, 1261-1284.
Liao, C. H., & Hsu, A. W. H., 2013. Common membership and effective corporate governance: Evidence from audit and compensation committees. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 21(1), 79-92.
Lie, E., 2005. Operating performance following open market share repurchase announcements. Journal of Accounting and Economics 39, 411-436.
Lowry, M., Murphy, K.J., 2007. Executive stock options and IPO underpricing. Journal of Financial Economics 85(1), 39-65.
Masson, R.T., 1971. Executive motivations, earnings, and consequent equity performance. The Journal of Political Economy, 1278-1292.
McAnally, M., Srivastava, A., Weaver, C., 2008. Executive stock options, missed earnings targets and earnings management. The Accounting Review 83, 185-216.
Mehran, H., 1995. Executive compensation structure, ownership, and firm performance. Journal of Financial Economics 38, 163-184.
Palmon, O., Yosef, S.B., Chen, R.R., Venezia, I., 2008. Optimal strike prices of stock options for effort-averse executives. Journal of Banking & Finance 32, 229-239.
Peng, L., Roell, A., 2003. Executive pay, earning manipulation and shareholder litigation. Unpublished paper (Baruch College, NY and Princeton University, NJ).
Ross, S., 1973. The economic theory of agency: The principal’s problem. American Economic Review 63, 135-139.
Stammerjohan, W., 2004. CEO compensation and subsequent firm performance: An empirical investigation. Corporate Ownership & Control, 86-103.
Van der Zahn, M., Tower, G., 2005 Composition of key board of director sub-committees: Did the Higgs report get it right? Presented at the AAA National Meeting, San Francisco, August.
Yermack, D., 1997. Good timing: CEO stock option awards and company news announcements. The Journal of Finance, 449-476.
Zheng, X., Cullinan, C.P., 2010. Compensation/audit committee overlap and the design of compensation systems. International Journal of Disclosure and Governance 7(2), 136-152.

指導教授

盧佳琪(Chia-Chi Lu)

審核日期

2016-7-19

推文