||This paper explores the impact of different types of investors on the corporate performance. This paper focus on five Southeast Asian countries, including Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand, during the period of 2007 to 2016. The empirical study shows that the upshot of different types of ownership are different among those countries. In general, different types of holdings show no significant effect on corporate performance in the first year, however, the impact magnifies in the following year. Foreign holdings and english-law ownership shows significant positive effect on corporate performance in the following year, but other types of ownership have no such effect nonetheless. Finally, this study categorize those five countries into common-law countries and civil-law countries - citing the LLSV(1997). The results show that foreign ownership can indeed promote corporate performance in both english-law counties and civil-law countries. Domestic ownership in english-law countries exibit improvement in corporate performance, although its effect is less significant than foreign ownership. Meanwhile, civil-law countries do not have such result. The result demonstrates that foreign ownership, regardless of law affiliation, plays an important role in promoting corporate performance in Southeast Asia.|
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